

Means, Motives and Opportunities in Ethno-Nationalist Mobilization

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Building on the most important theoretical tools from the literatures on social movements and nationalism, we propose a model of the intensity of nationalist political behavior in which a community's means, motives, and opportunities assume the central roles in the initiation and escalation of nationalist contentious politics. We then test this model using multinomial logit on original data from the seventeen autonomous communities of Spain over a twenty-year period. The results demonstrate that the means, motives, and opportunities assume vital, yet nonlinear, roles in determining a community's level of electoral, violent, and nonviolent contentious activity. The findings also show that there are crucial differences in what accounts for the moves to electoral contention, to protest, and to rebellion. Several of these factors are uniformly escalatory on the intensity of contention—especially repression, social mobilization, and regime change—while others, most importantly democracy, have a moderating effect on the generation of conflict. The results further imply processes of a diffusion of rebellious activities and of an organizational-level substitution effect between violent and nonviolent forms of political behavior. At the aggregate community level, however, escalation in contention involves a “cumulative effect” rather than a classic “substitution effect.”

KEYWORDS *nationalism, ethnic conflict, nationalist conflict, protest, rebellion*

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Virtually all countries are burdened by the fact that the boundaries of the nation and the state do not fully coincide. The end result is an international system beset by the endemic, disruptive forces of ethnic nationalism. Not all forms of nationalist expression are equally insidious, however. Though the violent rebellious tactics of such groups as the Corsicans, Kurds, and Chechens may grab the headlines, the majority of nationalist claims-makers—the Québécois, the Aborigines, the Scottish, and the Catalans, among others—opt instead for a less violent social movement approach or a purely conventional electoral strategy. What is more, as Gellner once argued, there are vastly more linguistic, ethnic, and cultural communities than there are nationalist movements or states: “for every effective nationalism, there are n potential ones . . . which do not bother to struggle, which fail to activate their potential nationalism, which do not even try” (1983, p. 45). The most common form of expression for potential nations, it seems, is to not express themselves at all.

This leads us to a fundamental question: what incites nations to intensify their claims-making behavior—from quiescence to electoral strategies, from elections to protest, and from protest to rebellion? In this paper we use multinomial logit regression on data gathered on the seventeen regions of Spain over a twenty-year period (1977–1996) to help answer that question. We argue that the level of political expression in an ethno-national community is dependent on its means, its motives, and its opportunities. More extensive means and motives predispose an ethnonational community to higher levels of expression; this “mobilization potential” is then activated, exacerbated, transformed, appeased or crushed according to the structure of the movement’s political opportunities.

We find that, as hypothesized, the three cluster concepts of means, motive, and opportunity evince powerful effects on the generation and escalation of nationalist protest politics. Equally important is the finding that there are crucial differences in what accounts for a community’s shifts among electoral, protest, and rebellious political behavior. In effect, by using our analytical framework, we are able to acquire a better understanding of which features of the political environment tend to have an “escalatory” impact on conflict (especially repression and regime change), and which others a generally “ameliorative” effect (level of democracy). The results further intimate a process of the diffusion of rebellion and of an organizational-level substitution effect between more and less intense forms of political contention. At the aggregate community level, however, escalation in contention involves a “cumulative effect” rather than a “substitution effect.” Ethno-national communities do not so much “substitute” contentious strategies as they “add” to existing strategic repertoires.

MEANS, MOTIVE AND OPPORTUNITY IN THE EXPRESSION OF
ETHNO-NATIONALIST DEMANDS

Research into ethno-national phenomena has long been split along a multitude of disciplinary and theoretical lines. Dividing this literature into broad analytical clusters, a first branch of research, primarily in the nationalism and ethnic politics fields, has concentrated on a variety of normally structurally based cultural, linguistic, geographical, or socio-demographic pre-determinants that essentially provide national communities the identity (Coser, 1956; Barth, 1969; Horowitz, 1985; Anderson, 1991; Calhoun, 1993; Connor, 1993) or wherewithal (Deutsch, 1954; Tilly, 1978) to mobilize and activate their potential. A second broad camp has focused on the "politicization and activation of discontent" resulting from relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970) in the political (Horowitz, 1985, 1993), cultural (Connor, 1993), or economic fields (Horowitz, 1985; Olzak, 1992; Bookman, 1993). Lastly, a third approach has placed emphasis on how political and institutional opportunity structures (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 1996), especially repression (Davenport, 1995; Schock, 1996; Beissinger, 2002), federal status (Beissinger, 2002), and regime type and stability (Saideman et al., 2002), can impact a community's pattern of contention, generate important "substitution effects" (Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 2000), or lead to such escalatory processes as ethnic "outbidding" and "security dilemmas" (Roeder, 1991; Posen, 1993; Fearon and Laitin, 2000).

In short, there is a substantial literature that demonstrates how either grievances, structural pre-determinants, or political and institutional factors individually play important roles in the generation of ethno-nationalist conflict. The evidence would be even more meaningful, however, were we to find ways to combine these fundamental aspects of the conflict process. Similarly frustrated with the various sub-disciplines "talking past one another" (McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow, 1996, p. 21) and the consequent lack of progress in explanations of ethno-nationalist phenomena, the past decade has seen a cadre of researchers attempting to build such "integrated" models of domestic and nationalist conflict. In the ethno-politics field, Gurr has been most notable in his efforts to develop a theoretical synthesis of the relative deprivation, resource mobilization, and political opportunity approaches (1993, 2000). In the social movement and domestic conflict fields, meanwhile, Lichbach (1998) and McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (1996) have spelled out proposals for the development of integrated *generic* models of civil conflict designed to equally shed light on ethnic and nationalist conflict: the former via the search for links between the rational actor and political opportunity structure approaches, and the latter via the exploration of potential syntheses of the nationalism and social movement literatures

with an expanded, more all-encompassing political opportunity structure theory.

In effect, there is ample evidence that the grievances and incentives of the deprivation school, the community-level mobilizational capacity of the resource mobilization approach, the opportunities of structural political opportunity theory, and the identity and “structural pre-determinants” of the nationalism literature all play a critical part in the generation of ethno-political conflict. We argue here that we could further our understanding of ethno-nationalist conflict were we to develop an approach that integrated these core factors while bridging the gaps among the literatures on social movements, domestic conflict processes, and nationalism. How? The answer lies in viewing nationalism as a politically mediated social movement.

What do we gain from such an approach? First, bridging the gap between the literature on social movements and that on nationalism would help address one of the fundamental reasons for why nationalist phenomena remain inscrutable—the failure of researchers to connect these two complementary literatures (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 1996). More importantly, the focus on the constituent parts of a social movement (Kriesi et al., 1995)—the actors involved, the issues raised, the process of mobilization, and the actions undertaken—permits us to reconceptualize our thinking about the “usual suspects” in the development of nationalism.

Viewed from a different angle, we can see that the various structural pre-determinants—the community’s geographical, historical, ethno-linguistic, and socio-demographic characteristics—function as resources for the mobilization of any real or potential ethno-national community. The group’s numerous grievances, then, supply the reason for mobilization. Lastly, the political environment conditions the opportunities of the community to contend in a conventional, violent, or nonviolent manner. The answer effectively lies not in choosing which of the central explanatory factors exerts prime causality, but in reconceptualizing these factors such that we can meaningfully integrate them into a coherent model of ethno-nationalist expression.

Another way of looking at it is the analogy of a detective investigating a crime. As any investigator knows, if you wish to unearth the perpetrator, you must determine who had the means, who had the motive, and who had the opportunity. So it is with the expression of nationalism. If we are to understand nationalist contention, we must look at which communities have the means, which have the motive, and which have the opportunity to mobilize politically in the expression of nationalist demands. We must, in other words, understand the extent of social and mobilizational resources that give a community the capacity to organize, the level of grievances that could lend the desire to mobilize, and the nature of the

political opportunities that channel and constrain the mobilized group's potential behavior. All three are essential elements in our investigation of this nationalist mystery.

Interpreting Nationalist Claims-Making—Electoral Politics, Protest, and Rebellion

Most studies focus exclusively on only one form of expression—electoral, protest or rebellion—in isolation from the others. The resultant constraint on theory-building, and in turn on our understanding of nationalism writ large, is considerable. Our studies would yield greater understanding were we to theoretically link the diverse political activities of nationalist actors. The conceptual umbrella that permits such a connection is the relatively recent notion of contentious politics, which Tarrow defines as “collective activity on the part of claimants—or those who claim to represent them—relying at least in part on noninstitutional forms of interaction with elites, opponents, or the state” (1996, p. 874). In this framework, there is “no fundamental discontinuity” between institutional and noninstitutional politics; in fact, protest, rebellion, and conventional electoral politics should each be viewed as “one strategic choice among others” depending on the situation (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 1996, p. 27).

The ultimate goal, in short, is to develop a methodological and empirical framework that will allow us to operationalize the theoretical links among the different forms of political behavior. For this reason, though the explanatory model we have presented herein could be used to examine in isolation levels of electoral contention, the extent of rebellion, or the magnitude of protest, we are interested here instead in something new—the development and testing of a syncretic methodological framework that will allow us to examine the continuities and discontinuities among the three primary forms of political expression. Working within the framework of “contentious politics,” our solution is to view protest, rebellion, and conventional electoral politics as often substitutable strategic choices depending on the means, motives, and opportunities of the ethno-national group.

When we apply this framework concurrently to the study of the full range of political behavior of nationalist groups—the participation in electoral politics, the engagement in social movement protest activities, and the violent rebellious actions of covert organizations—we can address the fluctuating, multifaceted relationships among institutional and noninstitutional politics. We can in the process examine whether what motivates groups to engage in electoral politics is the same as what motivates them to engage in protest or rebellion and whether, when nationalism does develop, the various forms of expression are substitutable. We can, furthermore, address the fundamental question of what incites nations to intensify their claims-making behavior.¹

DATA AND METHODS

Case Selection

To operationalize the model, we utilize data gathered from a variety of sources on the seventeen regions in Spain over a twenty-year period (1977–1996), for a total of 340 observations.² As noted, the analytical focus is on the level of contentious activity within entire national communities (or groups), such as the Basques, rather than on the activities of specific nationalist organizations (e.g., ETA) acting within those communities. A national community is not a homogeneous entity; there can be numerous organizations—each with distinct strategies and goals—operating on behalf of it at any given time. The community-level study conducted here focuses on the determinants of the aggregate of these organizations' contentious actions.

Our analysis begins as the democratic transition (1975–1982) was in its initial stages and ends after the democratization process had been firmly entrenched, thereby affording ample variation in the regime-level opportunity factors central to the theoretical model. At the same time, the Spanish state contains a number of important ethno-political movements that vary in terms of strength, the use of violence, and outcomes.³ In order to get a more realistic view of how nationalism does—or does not—develop, we must account for this variation without sampling on the dependent variable.⁴ The present design accomplishes this by measuring contention in each of the seventeen historic regions of the country regardless of the extent of current ethnonationalist political activity.

Measurement of the Model

We argue above that an ethno-national community's means, motives, and opportunities combine to determine its level of nationalist political expression. Since we are also interested in what moves groups between more and less contentious forms of political behavior, we operationalize the dependent variable, nationalist political expression, as a scale of possible actions. For each year we assign every ethno-national community one of the following scores depending on the highest level of political expression that takes place:

1. no claims-making (no nationalist contention)
2. electoral expression (nationalist parties obtain 5 percent or more of regional electoral vote)
3. nonviolent protest (two or more nationalist protest events)
4. violent rebellion (two or more nationalist rebellious events)

Each region's yearly expression score is thus dictated by its most militant political manifestation of nationalism. To create this measure, we first

acquired data on the electoral, protest, and rebellious activities of nationalists in each of the seventeen communities throughout the country from 1977–1996.⁵ To assign the electoral scores, data were first gathered for all regional and national elections in the post-Franco era.⁶ Of particular interest was the percentage of the vote that was garnered in each Autonomous Community by regional nationalist political parties (such as the Basque Nationalist Party in the Basque Country or the Valencian Nationalist Bloc in Valencia). We then used Spain's five-percent threshold for political party representation to determine whether a community could be considered to contain "electoral nationalism" in any given year. In effect, for each year that regional nationalist political parties garnered greater than 5% of the regional electoral vote (for years in between elections, scores were interpolated), that community received a score of at least "1" on the expression scale (or higher, if the community also engaged in a more intense form of contentious activity). For years in between elections, scores were interpolated.

The protest and rebellion scores are derived from an ethnonationalist contentious event data set developed from a non-sampled investigation of the annual indices to the Spanish daily *El País* from 1977–1996.⁷ These indices contain categorized summary reports of all articles appearing in the print version, and each summary report includes information on the time, place, actions, actors, and incidents surrounding each episode. Throughout Spain over the twenty-year time frame of the study, we recorded information on 4,267 nationalist contentious events. Using the same classificatory scheme for each event as the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project, nonviolent events were coded as "protest" and violent events as "rebellion."⁸ Concurrently, each event was assigned a "region" label according to which of the seventeen Spanish regions formed the basis of support for the ethno-political action. That is, protest demonstrations undertaken by "Galician" ethno-political actors were counted as "Galician" protest events, wherever the action took place.⁹ In those years where an ethno-national community contained two or greater protest events,¹⁰ it was assigned a score of "2" on the expression scale; in those years where a community contained two or greater rebellion events, in turn, it was assigned a score of "3."

Appendix 2 contains the annual expression scores, along with the constituent "electoral," "protest," and "rebellion" scores, for each of the seventeen regions (see the Web appendix on the first author's website for further information on sources, data-gathering techniques, and data-verification procedures). There is a great deal of variation in the form of expression of nationalist demands both across time and across cases. Immediately striking is that rebellion is not used exclusively by Basque separatists. Rebellious tactics are used at some point in time by organizations working on behalf of six of the seventeen autonomous communities. Electoral and protest activity, understandably, are much more diffuse: each is manifest in twelve of the regions over the course of the study. Only three of the regions—Murcia,

Madrid, and Castilla-La Mancha—fail to generate any form of nationalist political expression from 1977–1996.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: MEANS, MOTIVES, AND OPPORTUNITIES

Means

How should we operationalize the community-level mobilizational resources that serve as the *means* for political expression? As argued above, the means are a combination of various structural pre-determinants derived from the resource mobilization and nationalism literatures. A useful framework for integrating these approaches at the macro level is Deutsch's (1954) notion of "social mobilization." All of Deutsch's indicators of social mobilization, from education to urbanization to newspaper readership and beyond, tap mobilizational resources at the community level; the more extensive these are in a given place, the better able the community will be to mobilize its members into political parties and social movement organizations. These resources provide, in effect, the generic means for organized community-level claims-making.

The nationalism literature has long noted the importance of cultural markers (language, race, religion) and boundary-formation in ethno-political struggles (Coser, 1956; Barth, 1969; Anderson, 1991; Calhoun, 1993; Fox, 2004) as well as the distinctive, powerful psychological pull of appeals to the national group identity (Horowitz, 1985; Connor, 1993) in mobilizing members of a communal group. Therefore, when we are interested in mobilization specifically around *nationalist* demands, we can improve upon Deutsch's framework by incorporating measures of the strength of the distinctive regional identity. In fact, one of Deutsch's original propositions integrated this idea with that of social mobilization: "[t]he share of the [socially] mobilized but differentiated persons among the total population . . . is the first crude indicator of the probable incidence and strength of national conflict" (1954, pp. 103–104).

This hypothesis actually integrates three different sets of variables: (1) the social mobilization of the national group, (2) the group's relative size, and (3) the strength of the group's identity. The relative size of a community (Lindström and Moore, 1995; El-Badawi and Sambanis, 2002) together with its level of social mobilization indicates its generic "mobilization potential"—its capacity to mobilize community members in any social movement issue area. And when these factors are viewed in conjunction with the subjective and linguistic strength of its identity (Lindström and Moore, 1995; Gurr and Moore, 1997; Gurr, 2000), we acquire a good sense of its potential to organize specifically around nationalist issues. The conjunction of resources

plus identity, in short, represents a community's nationalist mobilization potential.

We operationalize this potential via three variables. First, we measure social mobilization with *Literacy*, the proportion of each region's adult population that is literate.¹¹ Second, to measure the group's *Relative Population*, the absolute population of each region is divided annually by the total population of the entire country. Finally, we tap the strength of the group's distinct ethno-regional identity via *Cohesion*, an indicator that reflects the percentage of each region's population that believes the respective region is a "nation" rather than merely a "region"¹² Such an indicator makes particular sense in the Spanish context, where residents are cognizant of the different political ramifications of a *región* versus a *nación*.¹³

We should expect that, the higher a community's scores on these three variables—that is, the more extensive its community-level mobilizational resources—the better able it will be to mobilize and organize its members. These three variables thus tap the nationalist mobilization potential of the ethno-national community.

Motives

When this mobilization potential is activated by a heightened sense of collective grievances (Gurr, 1993; Lindström and Moore, 1995; Dudley and Miller, 1998), active mobilization into political parties or open or militant movement organizations is likely to occur. One of the most powerful incentives for mobilization derives from resentment over the loss of historical autonomy (Gurr, 2000; Gurr and Moore, 1997). Accordingly, our first indicator of community-level motives extends the *Autlost* variable from the MAR data set (Gurr, Marshall, and Davenport, 2002).¹⁴ *Autlost* is an index of potential grievances based on the loss of historical political privileges. If a group has never lost autonomous political rights or undergone a transfer of control from one state to another, then its value is 0 ("no historical autonomy"). For all other groups, a score from 1 to 5 is assigned considering the following three factors: 1) the extent of prior autonomy, 2) the magnitude of the loss of autonomy, and 3) the time elapsed since the loss.

Second, we operationalize the other potential grievances of community members using periodically recurring survey data that tap subjective sentiments of nationalist aggrievement. *Grievance* is based on responses to a question concerning the desired organization for the Spanish state—in increasing order of devolution, centralization, autonomous communities, federalism, or independence. Those in favor of independence desire greater autonomy for their home region than that allowed for under current arrangements; they presumably feel, by extension, a sense of autonomy-related grievance that could lead to mobilization into nationalist organizations. *Grievance* was therefore created by using the percentage of respondents in

each community in favor of the independence option.¹⁵ Expectations for both grievance variables are straightforward: the more extensive the motives, the higher the level of ethno-national political expression that will take place.

Third, we include a measure of Regional Gross Domestic Product per Capita. Regional GDP per capita is measured here as a proportion of the overall Spanish average of 100, adjusted annually.¹⁶ These scores are then transformed into logged values. It can be difficult to predict the overall impact of regional GDP per capita on contentious politics, since economic development unleashes three contradictory forces. First, it increases the capacity for mobilization and contention via increases in Deutschian social mobilization (Deutsch, 1954) and social capital (Putnam, 2000). Second, economic development leads to processes of social change that generate new and often more contentious forms of intergroup and class conflict. Lastly, greater economic wealth serves to quell economic-based grievances (Muller and Weede, 1990; Auvinen, 1997; Collier and Hoeffler, 2001).¹⁷ In short, there are good reasons for characterizing heightened regional GDP per capita as a means-enhancing factor, and equally cogent arguments for citing lagging economic performance as a factor motivating the expression of nationalist demands. We side with Gurr (2000) in predicting that the grievance side of the equation is stronger; weaker economic development will produce a relative sense of deprivation that leads to heightened communal grievances.

Opportunities: The Political Opportunity Structure

Unlike means and motives, which tend to work unidirectionally and have a consistent, linear impact on the conflict process, political opportunity structure (POS) is a cluster concept not amenable to operationalization via a single variable or index. Each of the central components of the POS, in fact, may condition the expression of political demands in a unique fashion. For this reason, political opportunities are operationalized via several discrete indicators.¹⁸

DEMOCRACY

A central tenet of POS theory is that disparate political structures favor distinct forms of political behavior. In a democratic regime, social movement protest is often “normalized” (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998). Claims-making is effectively channeled towards conventional and nonviolent unconventional forms of expression (Gurr 2000). The opposite is true of autocratic societies, where societal pressures—to the extent they are not suppressed—are more likely to be expressed violently.¹⁹ Democracy was calculated annually by averaging the scores of the Freedom House (2000) political rights and civil

liberties indexes. Values for Spain range from 4 in 1977 to 7 in 1996. We reversed the values from the original data set so that higher scores represent a more open regime. Democracy should thus obtain a positive relationship with electoral expression and protest, and a negative relationship with rebellion.

A counter-claim has been offered by a group of scholars (e.g., Horowitz, 1985; Kaufman, 1996) who argue that violent conflict will often be higher in democratic states as a result of “ethnic outbidding.” According to this argument, electoral competition between elites for the support of members of the same ethnic community can result in attempts to outbid each other with inflammatory appeals to ethnicity, which can eventually lead to violent confrontations and the weakening of democratic institutions.

Regime Change

Regime change indicates the extent of change in the country’s democracy score from the previous year. Regime change has been posited to affect contention in several ways. First, liberalization might appease contentious groups, resulting in decreased protest and rebellion. In a similar vein, Davenport (1999) and Zanger (2000) posit that regime openings tend to decrease repression, which might in turn contribute to lower levels of contentious activity. In contrast, Gurr (2000) makes the argument that the instability and insecurity engendered by democratic regime change can create a substantial, albeit transient, increase in the opportunities for group mobilization and contention (see also Tarrow, 1994; Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch, 2001).²⁰ This supports a growing literature that posits the inflammatory impact of regime change—and regime openings in particular—on ethnic and nationalist conflict (Horowitz, 1993; Snyder, 1999; Saideman, et al. 2002). International relations-based rational choice scholars, for instance, have argued that regime openings can engender the manipulation of ethnic and national identities by “ethnic entrepreneurs” and increase the likelihood of ethnic “outbidding” and “security dilemmas” (see Fearon and Laitin, 2000 for an overview). In extreme cases, such as in the former Yugoslavia, these processes can lead to large-scale mobilization and conflict. We thus expect a positive relationship between regime change and expression.

Repression

Repression taps restrictions on political activity via the measurement of the number of arrests, injuries or deaths per protest event in the country as a whole.²¹ Repression does serve as an important grievance of nationalist groups (Gurr, 2000); yet, on account of its ability to constrain and condition political behavior, it is better depicted as a central component of the political

opportunity structure (Tarrow, 1994; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 1996). There is, in fact, substantial evidence that repressive regime responses to collective action can exacerbate domestic and ethnopolitical conflict (Lichbach, 1987; Tarrow, 1994; Francisco, 1995; Schock, 1996; Gurr and Moore, 1997; Moore, 2000; Beissinger, 2002) and incite mobilization among previously unmobilized populations (Gurr, 1993, 2000; Krain, 1998). Recent arguments have shown, however, that the effect of repression is not monotonic: according to the “substitution effect” (Lichbach, 1998; Moore, 2000), activists will substitute violent for nonviolent contention, and vice versa, depending on which is more actively pursued by public security forces. If this argument holds at the community level tested here, then increased levels of “protest policing” should be associated with decreases in nonviolent protest yet increases in both violent rebellious activities and electoral expressions of nationalism.

General Protest and General Rebellion

To help control for cycles of contention (Tarrow, 1994) and help operationalize the size of the violent and nonviolent social movement sectors (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 1996), we have included measures of the general country-wide levels of protest and rebellion, *General Protest* and *General Rebellion*, which were calculated by summing the scores for protest and rebellion, respectively, of all seventeen communities (i.e., for all of Spain) each year. We expect that, the greater the extent of protest and rebellion in Spain as a whole in any given year, the more likely a community is to engage in that form of political behavior.

Nationalist Representation in Government

Nationalist Government operationalizes the extent to which the ethno-national group's interests are incorporated into the state's political decisionmaking processes. The logic is that, when an ethno-national community's demands can be met via conventional means—such as occurs in federal systems—there is little reason to resort to nonconventional claims-making in the form of protest or rebellion (Lijphart, 1977). Nevertheless, there is some evidence for the counterclaim that nationalist representation in government increases nationalist conflict. Roeder (1991) and Snyder (1999) argue that, in a process similar to ethnic outbidding, the devolution of power can have the counterintuitive effect of increasing demands for further autonomy by rendering it rational for politicians to make contentious appeals to nationality. This is especially dangerous with “incongruent federalism,” where the boundaries of the sub-federal political unit and an ethnic minority coincide (Lijphart, 1999). In such cases, the existence of an autonomous region effectively provides a ready-made template for secession.

In cross-national tests, it makes sense to operationalize conventional incorporation into the polity via autonomy statutes and the like. However, since all of the regions in Spain have attained a relatively high degree of political autonomy since 1980, further sophistication was necessary for the present test. Instead of merely measuring the existence of autonomy, we have also measured nationalist political parties' degree of involvement in the regional governments. All communities receive a score of 0 for their respective pre-autonomic periods, and a score from 1 to 5 in those cases where a nationalist party forms the regional government alone or in a coalition, using the following rules: (1) no nationalist representation in the regional government, (2) nationalists are minor partners in government (one seat in cabinet); (3) significant partner in government (several seats in cabinet); (4) major partner in government (greater than 20% of seats in cabinet); and (5) nationalist majority government.²²

Ideological Compatibility of Central and Regional Governments

Using the same logic, we argue that, if the ideological orientations of the regional and central governments are similar (i.e., both right-wing or both left-wing), regional political concerns are more likely to be addressed, thereby diminishing the incentive to resort to nonconventional claims-making. We operationalize this compatibility with a dummy variable, Ideological equivalence, where a score of "1" is assigned to those regions during years in which the left-right ideological orientation of the regional government is the same as that of the central government (Source: *El País: Anuario*, editions 1982–1996).

Number of Elections

Davenport (1998) finds that elections are associated with decreased repression, which in turn could ameliorate domestic conflict. On the other hand, regional and federal elections do create increased political space for ethno-nationalist actors to contend and push ethno-nationalist claims further into the spotlight. For this reason, we expect a positive relationship between contention and *Elections*, an annual frequency count of the number of regional and federal elections in each Autonomous Community (Source: *El País: Anuario*, editions 1982–1996).

Lag of Expression

To control for potential temporal dependence, we include a lagged version of *expression*.

ESTIMATION PROCEDURE AND RESULTS

As noted above, our dependent variable, *nationalist political expression*, is a categorical variable of the intensity of claims-making behavior by ethnonationalist groups. We code this variable according to the highest action—none, electoral, protest, or rebellion—taken by each group per year. Our first inclination was to use ordered logit to estimate our model. However, for several reasons we dismissed this estimation technique in favor of multinomial logit (MNL). First, to correctly employ ordered logit, the parallel regression assumption must be met (Long, 1997). In our case, we suggest that the effects of some independent variables (e.g., democracy and repression) are not uniform across categories of the dependent variable. An approximate likelihood ratio test confirms that the odds are not proportionate across categories of the dependent variable ($\chi^2 = 157.65$, $p \leq 0.00$), indicating that ordered logit is not suitable for use with our model. In addition, ordered logit does not allow for the examination of the specific impact of the independent variables on different categories of the dependent variable. Multinomial logit, however, does provide such results and as such is an excellent estimation technique for our purposes. In assessing the appropriateness of the MNL technique, a Wald test suggests that our dependent variable categories should not be combined (all χ^2 's are significant at $p \leq 0.00$), and a series of Hausman tests for the independence of irrelevant alternatives suggest that electoral expression, protest, and rebellion are independent of one another.²³ Accordingly, multinomial logit with Huber/White robust standard errors is employed to estimate the effects of the explanatory variables on political expression.

Multinomial logit analysis estimates the effects of a model's independent variables on the odds of one value of the dependent variable compared to another value. The multiplicative logit coefficients reported in Table 1 indicate the factor by which the odds of a region containing one level of political expression versus another level will change for each one-unit increase in the independent variable, holding all other variables constant. Coefficients greater than one hence signify an increased likelihood of that outcome, while coefficients less than one indicate a decreased likelihood.²⁴

The dependent variable in Table 1 is operationalized such that the first level of political expression represents a community that engages in electoral forms of contention, the next level represents a community that engages in elections as well as nonviolent protest (and often electoral politics as well), and the highest level a community that contains violent rebellious activities (in many cases in addition to political party politics and social movement protest). By coding the dependent variable in this fashion, we are able to observe how the model variables affect the intensity as well as the likelihood of the political expression of nationalist demands. Multinomial logit estimations thus capture the odds of moving between categories

TABLE 1 Multinomial Logit on Level of Nationalist Expression in 17 Regions of Spain, 1977–1996

	No Contention → Electoral			No Contention → Protest			No Contention → Rebellion			Electoral → Protest			Electoral → Rebellion			Protest → Rebellion		
	b	z	odds	b	z	odds	B	z	odds	b	z	odds	b	z	odds	b	z	odds
Means	0.08	0.60	1.08	0.20	1.26	1.22	0.32**	1.97	1.39	0.12	1.13	1.13	0.25**	2.03	1.28	0.13	1.41	1.14
Relative Population	-0.12*	-1.65	0.89	.21***	3.28	1.23	-0.16	-1.08	0.86	.32***	4.89	1.38	-0.04	-0.27	0.96	-0.36***	-2.60	0.70
Literacy	0.17*	1.86	1.19	0.30**	2.15	1.35	0.40***	2.66	1.50	0.13*	1.56	1.13	0.23**	2.07	1.26	0.10	0.86	1.11
GDP per capita	-4.61**	-2.16	0.01	-5.23**	-2.40	0.01	-2.87	-1.11	0.06	-0.62	-0.57	0.54	1.75	1.05	5.73	2.36	1.43	10.64
Grievances	-0.25***	-2.90	0.78	-0.14	-1.51	0.87	-0.12	-0.85	0.89	0.11	1.41	1.12	0.14	1.02	1.15	0.03	0.29	1.03
Lost Autonomy	37.05***	24.38	1.23E + 16	37.78***	23.96	2.55E + 16	37.74***	24.76	2.45E + 16	0.73	1.17	2.08	0.69	1.12	2.00	-0.04	-0.06	0.96
Opportunity	0.65*	1.58	1.92	-0.54	-1.02	0.59	1.85**	2.22	6.38	-1.18**	-2.34	0.31	1.20*	1.59	3.33	2.39***	2.85	10.89
Repression	-2.83***	-2.56	0.06	-3.36***	-2.60	0.03	-4.20***	-2.75	0.01	-0.53	-0.74	0.59	-1.37	-1.30	0.25	-0.85	-0.82	0.43
Democracy	1.03***	2.91	2.81	1.25**	2.12	3.49	2.46***	2.92	11.71	0.22	0.45	1.24	1.43*	1.86	4.16	1.21*	1.58	3.36
Regime Change	3.34***	3.67	28.18	3.28***	3.50	26.50	3.54***	3.49	34.49	-0.06	-0.22	0.94	0.20	0.42	1.22	0.26	0.62	1.30
Nationalist Government	0.01	1.16	1.01	0.00	0.16	1.00	0.00	-0.19	1.00	-0.01	-1.05	0.99	-0.02	-1.02	0.98	-0.01	-0.36	0.99
General Protest	0.01	1.25	1.01	0.00	-0.15	1.00	0.05***	2.46	1.03	-0.01	-1.40	0.99	0.02**	1.94	1.02	0.04***	3.06	1.04
Rebellion	-0.49	-0.67	0.61	-0.35	-0.40	0.71	0.99	0.83	2.68	0.14	0.25	1.15	1.48*	1.56	4.37	1.34	1.53	3.81
Ideological Equivalence	-0.81*	-1.77	0.44	-1.16**	-2.35	0.31	-1.91**	-1.99	0.15	-0.35	-0.81	0.70	-1.10	-1.25	0.33	-0.75	-0.84	0.47
Number of Elections	2.22***	4.04	9.17	1.81***	2.70	6.12	4.98***	5.31	145.92	-0.40	-0.89	0.67	2.77***	3.58	15.91	3.17***	4.10	23.84
Lag of Expression																		

*p ≤ 0.1, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01 (n = 323).

of contention as a result of the influence of the independent variables.²⁵ In particular, the table illustrates how each of these variables changes the odds of moving from no political expression to electoral contention (from 0 to 1); from no action to protest (0 to 2); from no action to rebellion (0 to 3); from electoral to protest behavior (1 to 2); from electoral to rebellious behavior (1 to 3); and from protest to rebellion (2 to 3). In brief, these logit estimations tell us how changes in the means, motives, and opportunities affect the odds of moving up the ladder of conflict intensity.

The results represent a substantial confirmation of both the utility of the theoretical model and the merits of testing this model with an integrated index of ethno-nationalist contention. Not only are means, motives, and opportunities shown to be powerful components in the production of nationalist political conflict, but the results reveal significant differences in the causal mechanisms that lead to electoral, protest, and rebellious forms of collective action.

The first causal step in the model is that regions with greater means to mobilize the population—that is, larger, more socially mobilized communities with strong ethno-regional identities—are more likely to be engaged in increasingly intense claims-making behavior. The present results suggest that the most powerful impact in terms of means derives from a community's level of social mobilization. *Literacy* is in fact positively associated with increases in intensity at all levels save for the move from protest to rebellion. For politically inactive communities, the odds ratios indicate that each one-unit increase in literacy increases the odds of escalation to electoral, protest, and rebellious forms of contention by a factor of 1.19, 1.35, and 1.50, respectively; while for electorally contending communities, it boosts the odds of escalation to protest by a factor of 1.13 and to rebellion by a factor of 1.26.²⁶

Interestingly, groups with the vast mobilization potential engendered by distinctive ethno-regional identities are no more likely to choose protest over electoral politics or either protest or elections over political inaction. Instead, cohesion has a significant impact only in the selection of rebellion as the strategic focus. Holding all other variables constant, each unit increase in cohesion renders a community 1.39 times more likely to develop rebellious politics compared to political inactivity and 1.28 times more likely compared to electoral politics. In short, communities with strongly differentiated regional identities are no more likely to contain protest or electoral politics than they are to remain politically inactive. At the same time, such communities are much more likely to contain rebellious politics than any other form of political activity—another reason to pay special attention to political developments in such places.

The results are equally notable with the indicator of the relative size of a region's population. In brief, the larger the community, the more likely it is to contain protest politics than either rebellion, electoral politics, or

quiescence. A larger relative population also makes a region more likely to remain politically inactive than be engaged in electoral politics. The results effectively suggest that, though increases in population predispose a community to social movement protest activity, overall there is no monotonic relationship between population size and the intensity of political expression.

Overall, what impact do more extensive community-level means have on the intensity of political demands? As expected, a community's resources are strongly associated with the development of contentious nationalist politics. In particular, the relative size of a community, the strength of its distinctive ethno-regional identity, and the extent of its Deutschian social mobilization are vital components in whether or not a community will engage in protest, rebellion, or electoral politics. At the same time, these three types of community-level resources do not appear to increase the mobilization potential of communities uniformly for all three primary forms of contentious activity. *Cohesion* predisposes communities to rebellion, *relative population* predisposes communities to protest, but only *literacy* predisposes communities to general increases in the intensity of contentious politics at all levels. In short, the factors that determine the mobilization potential of nationalist communities are to a large part distinct for each form of contention.

As a second step in the causal model, we posited that active mobilization into political parties and open or militant movement organizations is even more likely when a community's mobilization potential is activated by a heightened sense of collective grievances. As with the means, the results here show that the impact of the motivational variables on contention is not uniform. To begin with, the measure of the proportion of the regional population that desires political independence for the community, *grievance*, fails to positively impact the escalation of conflict. Since independence-seekers should be those most amenable to mobilization into both conventional and nonconventional political organizations, we should expect that those communities with the greatest levels of these *independentistas* should contain more intense levels of political expression. The findings here suggest that, controlling for the other structural and political factors, subjective levels of autonomy-related grievances are not powerful. In fact, in the one case where it is significant, higher grievance values render a community more likely to remain politically inactive than to engage in electoral politics.

A much better predictor of increases in protest intensity derives from *lost autonomy*. Those regions that once enjoyed considerable autonomy are much more likely to contain electoral, protest, and rebellious tactics than they are to be politically quiescent. At the same time, for those communities already actively engaged in conventional or nonconventional contentious politics, lost autonomy fails to enhance the odds of political intensification.

As alluded to above, because of the contradictory forces unleashed by economic wealth, it was difficult to predict the overall impact of GDP per capita on regional-level contentious politics. It simultaneously enhances means, heightens intergroup tensions, and diminishes grievances. The findings here conform to previous research (Auvinen, 1997; Muller and Weede, 1990) that suggests the last of these processes is most powerful: though GDP per capita is not significant at the higher levels of political expression, at the lowest levels it has a powerful ameliorative impact on the intensity of political expression. Each one-unit increase in regional GDP per capita makes a community 100 times more likely to refrain from contentious nationalist politics altogether than to be engaged in either electoral or protest politics.²⁷

These results for the indicators of means and motives are significant. We posited that both would essentially work in concert to increase a community's mobilization in a more or less uniform fashion. That this was not the case is noteworthy; it also lends additional credence to the utility of the design chosen for this study. How are we ever to know, for example, the relative or nonlinear impact of means or motives on the movement between different levels of contention unless we allow for such potential movement in the research design? The present test is uniquely situated to help answer such questions.

The central argument of this paper, once again, is that community-level resources, or means, create the nationalist mobilization potential for each community; that this potential is most likely to be fulfilled when the community is motivated to act via extensive grievances; and that the political behavior of potential mobilizers is conditioned by the nature of the political opportunities and constraints placed on the group. As argued above, this political opportunity structure is not a single concept that can be measured as "open" or "closed." Rather, it is a cluster concept best measured via several discrete indicators, each of which may have a unique conditioning impact on political behavior. The results demonstrate that the POS variables do have the expected impact on the severity of nationalist contention. The intensity of contentious political behavior is higher, the heavier the repression, the more profound the regime change, and the less democratic the regime.

First, the findings suggest that there is a powerful "substitution effect" (Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 2000) in play with repression, whereby the government's repressive activities tend not only to spur quiescent communities to take part in contentious political behavior, but also to incite already contending groups to the most intense levels of political expression. As a repressive government would expect, higher levels of repression make a community less likely to escalate from electoral to protest forms of political behavior. This reduction in protest behavior comes at a heavy price, however. Each unit increase in repression increases the odds of a group moving

to rebellion from a state of quiescence by 538%, from electoral contention by 233%, and from protest by a striking 989%. This is damning evidence. In the end, repressive states may win the battle of protest, but they will likely lose the war.

The level of political freedoms (*democracy*) similarly plays a strong role in conditioning the intensity of political behavior. In the present test, though democracy does not appear to make a difference for communities that are currently engaged in contentious politics, it effectively differentiates contending from non-contending communities. In fact, each one-unit increase in democracy (values range from 4 to 7) makes a community on average about 100 times more likely to remain politically quiescent than to engage in either electoral, protest, or rebellious forms of contention.

These findings present a powerful affirmation of the benefits of democracy on the conflict process. At the same time, this contrasts with theoretical expectations of heightened electoral and protest behavior in more open regimes. Our hypothesis was that, in such environments, claims-making is effectively channeled away from rebellion toward electoral and nonviolent protest forms of political behavior. Instead, the results suggest that the effects of both this substitution process and of the greater political space available for political action in democracies is overshadowed by the ability of such regimes to appease potential challengers to the political order. There is no evidence, moreover, that democracy in Spain led to a process of "ethnic outbidding" (Horowitz, 1985; Kaufman, 1996). This bodes well for other emerging democracies.

A related question is the impact of regime change on the conflict process. The findings present substantial confirmation of a growing body of research that details the destabilizing and escalatory impact of regime change on domestic and ethno-political conflict (Horowitz, 1993; Tarrow, 1994; Snyder, 1999; Gurr, 2000; Saideman et al., 2002). These findings are robust at all levels of contention. Recent research (Hegre et al., 2001) suggests that the "unsettling period" of civil conflict seen in the aftermath of Spain's historic democratic transition is not abnormal: while in the long term full democratization delivers not only the most just but the most peaceful outcome, significant regime change in any direction can lead to stark increases in civil conflict propensities.

The final four variables in the model are critical components of the nationalist political opportunity structure. That is, each is a feature of the political environment that serves to condition levels of political behavior by nationalist actors in particular. The first is *Nationalist Government*, which measures the extent of nationalist political party representation in the regional autonomous government. Like democracy, it does not make a significant difference in strategic choices for communities that are already engaged in some form of contentious politics. Positive scores on Nationalist government do, however, dramatically decrease the odds of a community

being politically inactive. Contending communities are hence different from non-contending communities insofar as they are much more likely to have nationalists representing them in parliament. The bad news for federalists is that the devolution of power to regional ethno-national communities achieves no significant ameliorative impact on levels of contentious nationalist behavior. The unfortunate implication is that there may be some sort of disconnect between conventional access to the political system and both violent and nonviolent conflict. The good news, though, is that the appeasement of nationalist groups via the devolution of power does not push already contentious communities to escalate their strategic behavior.

Continuing the logic that increased access to conventional policymaking decreases participation in nonconventional protest and rebellion, we posited a negative relationship between political expression and the measure of ideological similarity between the central and regional governments. Contradicting this hypothesis is the finding that, in the one instance where it does make a significant difference, ideological equivalence appears to increase the odds of escalation from electoral to rebellious strategies.

We also predicted that, on account of the increased opportunities for cooperation, networking, and imitation engendered by more active social movement sectors, each community's level of political expression would be positively impacted by the generalized levels of protest and rebellion in the country as a whole—measured here by *General Protest* and *General Rebellion*. The first of these fails to attain significance at any of the levels of political behavior; communities' decisions to protest or otherwise escalate their contentious strategy are not ostensibly influenced by the protest behavior of others. The same is not true of general levels of rebellion: Each additional terrorist bombing or political assassination that takes place in the country increases the odds of any specific community containing rebellion by an average of 3%, regardless of the starting point on the expression scale. The implication is of a clear diffusion effect: the more extensive the violent rebellion in the country as a whole, the more likely each community is to make the leap to rebellion itself.

Finally, since election periods provide a forum for contentious political actors to keep nationalist arguments at the forefront of political debate and can also lead to increased government crackdowns, we included a measure of the number of regional and federal elections per year. No such effect obtained. For non-contending communities, in fact, *elections* is associated with decreased odds of developing any form of political expression. This is another encouraging sign for democratic governments.

CONCLUSIONS

In this study we have attempted to answer a fundamental question: what incites nations to intensify their claims-making behavior—from quiescence

to electoral strategies, from election to contention, and from protest to rebellion? We argued that one should search for answers in the conjunction of the means, the motives, and the opportunities of ethno-national communities. These factors help determine not only the likelihood of engagement in contentious nationalist politics, but also the intensity of that engagement.

How does the application of this model enhance our understanding of nationalist contention? First, we show that though some groups favor one strategy over another, those that express themselves at higher levels of conflict often simultaneously rely on less intense forms of contention. One of the primary benefits of our approach, however, is in how it facilitates an investigation of what is behind a group's moves up and down the ladder of expression. Our findings confirm that the resources available to and the grievances suffered by ethno-national communities are indeed associated with increased participation in more intense forms of political expression. At the same time, the means and the motives do not function wholly in the theorized manner. Not all aspects of the means and the motives behave in the expected linear manner on contention, while others, especially subjective levels of grievances, proved to be unimportant. In short, each aspect of the means and motives has a different impact, not only on contention as a whole, but on each distinct form of political expression.

The findings suggest, in short, that the operation of the means, motives, and opportunities on the intensity of political behavior is nonuniform. There are important differences in what causes movement among the various levels of expression. Consequently, we must be cautious in the future in imputing causality in those instances where the test has been conducted on merely one of the primary forms of action in isolation from the others. It also means we can effectively label many of the variables as being associated with a certain form of political expression.

First, the primary impact of high levels of democracy, low levels of lost autonomy, and greater numbers of *elections* is to predispose communities to political quiescence over any other alternative. These variables are thus significant in differentiating contending from non-contending communities. None of the variables serves only to foment electoral contention. Higher relative population scores work primarily to increase the odds of a community engaging in protest, while two of the variables—cohesion and general rebellion—are importantly chiefly for their effect on the likelihood of a community developing rebellious political behavior.

More broadly speaking, the nature of the research design pushes us to look for features of the political environment that specifically tend to ameliorate or exacerbate conflict behavior. This study suggests, first of all, that the most important ameliorative effects on the intensity of political expression derive from GDP per capita, elections and, especially, from democracy. In contrast to recent research (Snyder, 1999), these findings suggest that democratic regimes are best able to positively condition nationalist political

behavior. In contrast, social mobilization, repression, external rebellion and regime change all tend to be “escalatory” factors in the conflict process. Each of these variables increases the odds of an ethno-national community “trading up” to a higher level of contentious behavior.

Hopefully, the increase in contention due to democratization is not a long-term phenomenon. Given the above findings for democracy, the implication is that the instability engendered by regime change leads primarily to short-term disturbances in conflict propensities, but even of this we cannot be certain. With regards to general levels of rebellion, in turn, it looks as if there is a type of diffusion of rebellious activities throughout the country at certain periods. The findings further suggest that, since repression has the most profound impact of any of the variables on the escalation of conflict behavior, states should be especially wary of resorting to repressive measures of social control in combating these diffuse rebellious activities. Governmental repression starkly increases the odds that a previously inactive, electorally contending, or protesting community will escalate to rebellion.

These findings have important implications for the substitution effect literature. To begin with, we find indirect evidence of a classic organizational-level “substitution effect,” whereby activists substitute violent for nonviolent forms of contention in the face of increased coercive policing of protest activities. This serves to reinforce previous literature.

More importantly, we add to the substitution effect literature in two ways. First, we expand the argument beyond its basis in protest and rebellion to incorporate both quiescence and electoral contention. Specifically, we find evidence of nationalist communities “switching” not only from protest to rebellion, but also from protest to electoral contention as well as from quiescence to both electoral contention and rebellion. Overall, governmental repression of protest activities primarily seems to push nationalist actors away from protest—both up and down the ladder of contention—while simultaneously leading to an activation and intensification of contentious activity for previously inactive communities.

Second, building on the above point, we expand the substitution effect argument to the regional level. Because we utilize a regional-level analysis that focuses on the level of contentious activity within entire national communities rather than on the activities of specific nationalist organizations acting within those communities, we can only implicitly test the “substitution” behavior of individual nationalist actors (e.g., of organizations replacing protest behavior with rebellion in the face of repression). Instead, we find direct evidence of changes in contentious strategies at the community level; our findings confirm that as the configuration of motivating factors in a national community changes, nationalist actors working within that community do respond to the altered incentives and changing political context by moving up and down the ladder of contention. Our evidence does suggest, however, that at the regional level the escalation of strategies is cumulative

rather than substitutional. In any given ethno-national community, the “switching” behavior of individual nationalist organizations does not appear to affect the overall mix of strategies employed by the full array of nationalist organizations working in that community—a community that generates an escalation from protest to rebellion, for instance, still contains groups that utilize protest, and communities that escalate from electoral contention to protest contain groups that continue to utilize the electoral route. In short, what we see is that, at the community level, escalation in contentious strategy involves a “cumulative effect” rather than a “substitution effect.”

We believe these empirical and conceptual innovations to be important complements to the existing conflict processes and substitution effect literatures that should be tested in different contexts.²⁸ Importantly, these benefits derive directly from the nature of our “multi-group” research design, and point to the benefits of viewing contention at the aggregate ethno-national community level. Instead of merely focusing on one group or organization in a given ethno-national region, we focus on the actions of the aggregate of each region’s nationalist organizations. The approach (and therefore benefits) are thus distinct.

For instance, in attempting to understand the current conflict in Iraq, it is certainly worth investigating which factors drive the level of contention undertaken by, say, specific individual Sunni Arab organizations, clans, or tribes; equally important, arguably even more important, is the “community-level” question (analogous to our study) regarding which factors drive the level of contention among the entire Sunni Arab community. In effect, whether organizations in the Iraqi Sunni Arab community are collectively violent or nonviolent is of utmost importance to the ultimate success or failure of Iraq’s “nation-building” efforts. This is where our approach could be potentially useful. Moreover, when contention is viewed via our overarching lens of “contentious politics” (encompassing quiescence, electoral politics, protest, and rebellion), we effectively acquire a better sense of the causes of and connections between aggregate contentious strategies in ethno-national communities. The findings suggest an under-explored contentious dynamism in force in these communities.

In the end, our findings help explain Gellner’s puzzle concerning the relative weakness of nationalism. What this study underscores is that the escalation of nationalist conflict is generated by a complex system of causal mechanisms. It effectively takes the conjunction of a cluster of structural and political variables to “awaken” nationalist communities—whether “real” or “potential”—to mobilize and initiate a process of contentious political activity. Though more extensive means and motives predispose an ethno-national community to higher levels of expression, a group’s “mobilization potential” is activated, exacerbated, transformed, appeased or crushed according to the structure of the movement’s political opportunities. In underscoring the complex determinants of an ethno-political group’s

strategic choices, this study thus represents a critical step in understanding what incites nations to intensify and weaken their claims-making behavior.

CONTRIBUTORS

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NOTES

1. Others have also begun to look at this critical “intensification” question in regard to civil conflict. See especially Sambanis and Zinn (2004).

2. Since one of the variables is lagged, 323 observations are used to estimate the coefficients.

3. Yet, rarely do studies of nationalism in Spain take advantage of this multitude of cases. Most look separately at Basque or Catalan nationalism or, at best, compare the two.

4. This has been a concern with the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set, for example. Although MAR represents an excellent resource for testing an array of ethno-political phenomena, the data do not adequately incorporate weak or “potential” cases of nationalism (Fearon and Laitin, 1997). For instance, only the two strongest Spanish cases are included—the Basques and the Catalans.

5. Note that data for all variables, excluding the Spanish regime-level variables, are coded individually for each region, not Spain as a whole; the unit of analysis is the region/year.

6. Regional elections were held in 1983, 1987, 1991, and 1995 in all autonomous communities except Galicia, Andalusia, Catalonia, and the Basque Country, which individually set the timing for their own elections. To increase the accuracy of the early scores, vote data from the national elections of 1977 and 1979 were also used (Source: *El País: Anuario*, editions 1982–1996).

7. The best sources for analyzing the full range of ethno-nationalist contentious events in Spain are Spanish newspapers. The *New York Times* would be more accessible, but would not normally report anything but the most violent actions. The most reliable Spanish newspaper source, *El País*, has the benefit of being countrywide in scope and located in the geographic center of the country (i.e., it is not based in one of the regions with a salient ethno-political movement). As of 2001, the index to *El País* was available from mid-1976 (when the newspaper was founded) until the end of 1996. For more details, please see the Web appendix.

8. In MAR, violent events are generally coded as *rebellion*, nonviolent events as *protest*. The exception is rioting, coded under *protest* due to the fact that the violence is not premeditated.

9. In this data set, the region on behalf of which an organization struggles is almost invariably the same region in which the event takes place. The exception is ETA, which carried out violent ethno-political actions throughout Spain. These bombings are counted as “Basque” events.

10. This threshold ensures that a group uses protest or rebellion as a regular policy tool. The annual aggregation matches prior studies (Gupta et al., 1993; Davenport, 1995; Ekiert and Kubik, 1998; Krain, 1998).

11. Data available for 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992. Values for missing years determined via the interpolation and extrapolation functions in *Stata* 7.0 (Source: Fundació Bancaixa, 1995).

12. Surveys done in 1990, 1992, and 1996; scores are constant over time for each community. Values range from 1 for Murcia and La Rioja to 37.33 for Catalonia (Source: Moral, 1998).

13. This is further a recognition that, though nations are normally predicated on some set of ethnic or cultural characteristics, a nation is to a certain extent a state of mind: it simply comprises a group of people who believe they are members of a distinct national community (Connor, 1993).

14. MAR contains data only on Catalonia and the Basque Country; we therefore replicated MAR's coding procedures to assign *autlost* scores to the other 15 regions of Spain.

15. Surveys conducted in 1976, 1979, 1980 and 1990. Interpolation and extrapolation used to assign values for missing years (Sources: Ferrando, 1980; Ferrando et al., 1994).

16. These scores (along with the updated Spanish average of 100) were available for each of the seventeen regions for 1973, 1985, 1989, 1991, and 1993. Missing years between 1977 and 1996 were given scores via interpolation and extrapolation (Sources: Rodríguez, 1989; Heywood, 1995).

17. There is also evidence that economic development per se does not necessarily lead to a redress of economic-based grievances (see, among others, Bookman, 1993). In fact, in certain cases (e.g., Catalonia) regional leaders may feel that, despite their relative wealth, their region would be even wealthier were they to have formed a separate country.

18. In an early review of the literature, Tarrow (1988, p. 429) found that the most common POS variables were (1) regime type and capacity, (2) regime stability, (3) elite divisiveness, (4) repression, and (5) the presence of enemies and allies in the social movement sector (SMS). The last of these has proven difficult to operationalize in quantitative studies. Still, *General Protest* and *General Rebellion* can be considered together to provide a reasonable approximation of the notion of SMS. The other four concepts have been successfully incorporated into the present analysis: the first via democracy, the second (and, indirectly, the third) via regime change, and the fourth via repression. In addition, we have included a POS variable used in recent studies (Beissinger, 2002; Saideman et al., 2002) that is specifically relevant to nationalist political behavior—the extent to which regional nationalist actors are represented in the conventional political arena.

19. Gurr (1993) argues that the values and institutions of democracy tend to pacify the rebellious tendencies of potentially violent ethnic communities insofar as democratic states are less likely to rely on coercive means of social control (see also Gupta et al., 1993; Poe and Tate, 1994; Davenport, 1995, 1999; Zanger, 2000). Some argue hence that democracy is actually “a proxy variable for state preferences for policies of accommodation vs. repression, and that it is the mix of the latter rather than democratic institutions per se which affects conflict strategies” (Gurr and Moore, 1997, p. 1082). From this perspective, especially if repression is accounted for, democracy will not directly influence levels of protest or rebellion. We argue, in contrast, that regime type has a direct impact on contention above and beyond its indirect impact via repression.

20. In a large-scale test, Hegre et al. (2001) found that, while a full democratization delivers not only the most just but the most peaceful outcome in the long term, regime change in any direction “clearly and strongly increases the probability of civil war in the short run . . .” (p. 42).

21. This frequency count, or “protest policing,” approach to measuring coercive repression is analogous to measures used in Davenport (1995), Francisco (1995), della Porta and Reiter (1998), and Beissinger (2002). First, all instances of arrests, injuries, or deaths during protest activities were summed for the entire country each year. This figure was then divided by the total annual number of protests in the country (Source: annual indices to *El País* 1977–1996). Note that a disaggregated region-specific version of this measure could not be used in the present test, since the value would always be “0” unless the community had engaged in protest that year. This would effectively cancel out any understanding of the impact of repression on the escalation to electoral nationalism or protest.

22. In the Basque Country and Catalonia, the value is “5” for all years from 1980 to 1996. About half of the regions never receive a score above “1.” For others (e.g., 1995 and 1996 in the case of Valencia), a nationalist party rules in a coalition government for only a few years during the time period under consideration (Source: *El País: Anuario*, editions 1982–1996).

23. Amemiya (1981) suggests that multinomial logit (MNL) works well when the dependent variable categories are dissimilar and distinct outcomes. Likewise, McFadden (1973) suggests that multinomial logit models should be used in cases where dependent variable categories “can plausibly be assumed to be distinct and weighted independently in the eyes of each decision maker.” We are confident that this is the case with the categories of contention used here. A series of formal (Hausman) tests for the IIA assumption suggests that electoral action, protest and rebellion are all independent of one another and protest and rebellion are independent of no action (category 0). Electoral participation is not independent of no action ($\chi^2 = 83.56$, $p \leq 0.00$). However, we are convinced that, substantively, groups do recognize that having at least one seat in parliament is distinct to no seats. In addition, as noted above, the Wald test suggests that categories for no action (0) and protest (1) should not be collapsed ($\chi^2 = 1417.23$, $p \leq 0.00$). Given the overwhelmingly supportive findings of the IIA tests as well as the Wald test, we are confident that an MNL estimation technique is appropriate to estimate our model.

24. These odds ratios ($\exp(\beta_k)$) can also be transformed into a percentage change in the odds by subtracting 1 and then multiplying by 100. For further explanation of the interpretation of logit parameters and alternative methods of summarizing the results of MLE models, see Long (1997).

25. Of course, such an analysis would not be possible if ordered logit were employed.

26. The relatively low N for the analysis gives especially high weight to the significance levels. Hence, we would suggest that a p of $\leq .1$ still points to an interesting and important relationship between, for example, literacy and the move from non-contention to electoral expression.

27. The odds ratios listed in Appendix 2 show decreased odds of choosing protest and electoral politics over no contention. Decreases in odds, however, can be difficult to grasp intuitively. In such cases, we have the option of using the following formula to determine the increased odds of moving in the reverse direction: $(1 + \text{odds ratio})$. In this example, the odds ratios listed in Appendix 2 tell us that each one-unit increase in GDP per capita changes the odds of moving to electoral or protest politics by a factor of .01 or, transformed, that each unit increase in GDP per capita increases the odds of a region selecting no contention over elections or protest by a factor of 100.

28. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing us in this direction.

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APPENDIX 1: Summary Statistics (N = 323)

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
DEPENDENT VARIABLE				
Expression	1.26	1.08	0	3
MEANS				
Cohesion	9.92	10.45	1	37.33
Literacy	93.97	4.46	83.13	99.79
Relative Population	5.87	5.00	0.67	18.08
MOTIVE				
Log Regional GDP	4.58	0.22	4.12	5.02
Grievances	6.72	6.69	0	32.2
Lost Autonomy	0.59	0.77	0	2
OPPORTUNITY				
Repression	0.75	0.59	0.05	2.28
Democracy	6.28	0.70	4	7
Regime Change	0.18	0.58	-0.5	2
Nationalist Government	1.33	1.45	0	5
General Protest	102.95	34.80	64	190
General Rebellion	109.15	30.99	61	160
Ideological Equivalence	0.45	0.50	0	1
Number of Elections	0.56	0.53	0	2

APPENDIX 2: Annual Expression Scores with Original Vote, Protest and Rebellion Dummy Variable Values by Region, 1977–1996

Region	Date	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	
Andalucía	Vote	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	Rebel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Expression	2	1	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
Aragón	Vote	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Protest	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Expression	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	1
Asturias	Vote	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Protest	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Expression	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Balearic Islands	Vote	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Protest	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Expression	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	2
Basque Country	Vote	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Protest	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Expression	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Canary Islands	Vote	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Protest	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Expression	3	3	2	0	2	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2
Cantabria	Vote	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rebel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Expression	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Castilla y León	Vote	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Protest	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Expression	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Castilla-La Mancha	Vote	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Protest	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Expression	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cataluña	Vote	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Rebel	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Expression	2	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Extremadura	Vote	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Protest	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Expression	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Galicia	Vote	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Protest	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Expression	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Madrid	Vote	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Protest	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Expression	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Murcia	Vote	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Rebel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Expression	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Navarra	Vote	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Protest	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Expression	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Riña	Vote	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Protest	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Expression	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Valencia	Vote	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Protest	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
	Expression	1	2	2	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2