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REPRESSION, GRIEVANCES, MOBILIZATION, AND REBELLION: A NEW TEST OF GURR'S MODEL OF ETHNOPOLITICAL REBELLION

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Throughout the 1990s Ted Robert Gurr developed and refined a model of ethnopolitical rebellion built around four key determinants—identity, incentives, capacity, and opportunities. Lindström and Moore (1995), Gurr and Moore (1997), and Moore and Gurr (1998) have argued that the explanation Gurr proposes actually implies an interactive model in which these four factors, along with rebellion and repression, work interdependently to determine levels of rebellious ethnic conflict. In this study I utilize a three-stage least squares estimator to test the ability of this interactive model to explain the magnitude of ethnopolitical rebellion in the seventeen regions of Spain from 1977–1996. The use of an original event data set with enhanced indicators allows for the first test of Gurr's interactive model not based on the Minorities at Risk project, while the cross-temporal design facilitates the first full test of the model's democracy-rebellion linkages. This test demonstrates even stronger overall support for the theoretical model than previous analyses, which had failed to find evidence for the direct influence of grievances on rebellion, of democratization and repression on mobilization, and of democracy on repression. An important deviation from Gurr's model is the finding that three of the proposed indicators of deprivation—relative regional GDP, education, and regional autonomy—were found to have the opposite impact from that intended. Implications of these findings are explored in depth.

The post-Cold War period has seen both an explosion of ethnic and nationalist conflict behavior and the sophistication of explanations of that behavior. At the forefront of these advances has been Ted Robert Gurr. After nearly four decades of work on civil, ethnic and nationalist conflict, Gurr has developed a model of ethnopolitical behavior (1993a, 1993b, 1996, 2000) that integrates the literatures on nationalism, social

movements, and domestic conflict through four key explanans: *identity, incentives, capacity,* and *opportunities.* Because of the indirect or interdependent nature of several of the core variables, Lindström and Moore (1995), Gurr and Moore (1997), and Moore and Gurr (1998) have maintained that the model can be better served by an interactive three-stage least squares (3SLS) structural equation model than by traditional unidirectional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) models. Using cross-national data from the Minorities at Risk and Polity II data sets, these authors have shown that testing the model with a series of 3SLS structural equations yields valuable information for both the understanding and forecasting of ethnopolitical rebellion.

In this study I use an original event data set to test the ability of the theoretical model to explain the magnitude of ethnopolitical rebellion in the seventeen regions of Spain from 1977–1996. In this first test of the model not using the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set, I advance the explanation proposed by Gurr both by enhancing the operationalization of several of the key indicators and, more importantly, by analyzing the data over time. This permits the first full test of the linkages Gurr posits between regime type and rebellion.

This test demonstrates the utility of the theoretical model in predicting the intensity of rebellion in democratic Spain. At a general level, the results show that Gurr's theoretical synthesis can be effectively translated to more in-depth studies. In particular, the model shows that grievances, mobilization, and contagion have a direct impact on rebellion; repression, regional political control, educational levels, economic differentials, and unemployment rates directly determine grievances; identity, repression, grievances, democratization, and group size affect mobilization; and democracy, democratic durability, and rebellion impact repression. This analysis highlights the complex role played by the various transient and durable features of democratic regime type in generating rebellion, and also adds to a growing literature by underscoring the particularly deleterious effect of repression on the conflict process.

GURR'S INTERACTIVE MODEL OF ETHNOPOLITICAL REBELLION

One of Gurr's primary suppositions is that the study of ethnopolitical rebellion is best placed within the context of the domestic conflict and social movement literatures. Accordingly, the explanation he has developed is essentially a modified model of domestic civil strife. At its core is a theoretical synthesis of the central concepts of the three competing approaches to understanding civil conflict—*mobilizational capacity* from

resource mobilization[1] (Tilly, 1978), *incentives* (primarily grievances) from relative deprivation[2] (Gurr, 1970), and *opportunities* from structural political opportunity theory[3] (McAdam, 1982). The chief theoretical adaptation to the model supplied by the nationalism literature (see especially Horowitz, 1985) is the importance placed on group *identity* and cohesion in facilitating ethnopolitical mobilization and rebellion.[4]

Gurr weaves these four concepts into a coherent explanation of ethnopolitical rebellion:

> **Ethnopolitical action presupposes an *identity* group that shares valued cultural traits and some common *grievances* or aspirations. These sentiments and interests provide the essential bases for *mobilization* and shape the kinds of claims made by group leaders….The timing of action and the choice of strategies of participation, protest, or rebellion depend largely on political *opportunities* external to the group, principally its relationship to the state and external actors (Gurr, 2000, pp. 94-5, emphasis added).**

In short, Gurr's model (1993a, 1993b, 1996, 2000) at its core posits that ethnopolitical rebellion is more likely to develop within those groups that have the strongest, most cohesive *identities*; the greatest extent of *grievances* supplying the incentive to organize; the most elaborate networks and leadership capabilities that give them the capacity to successfully *mobilize*; and a set of external political factors furnishing the *opportunities* to mobilize against the state.

The interplay among identity, grievances, mobilization and opportunities hence forms the crux of the model that Gurr fully elaborates in two book treatments of ethnopolitical conflict (1993a, 2000). There have, however,

[1]Specific interest is placed on the capacity of groups to mobilize their members in support of collective action.

[2]The central premise is that conflict will result when relative inter-group inequities generate grievances that give groups the incentive to rebel.

[3]The primary hypothesis is that there are certain relatively stable features of the political environment, such as "…the formal organizations of government and public politics, authorities' facilitation and repression of claims-making by challenging groups, and the presence of potential allies, rivals or enemies" (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 1996, p. 24) that fundamentally condition political behavior and thereby transform "any polity's pattern of contention." Gurr uses the concept of political opportunity structure (POS) to refer to "factors external to a group that influence decisions about how to pursue ethnopolitical objectives" (2000, p. 80). Gurr's version of opportunities thus goes beyond the primarily domestic regime-level POS to include a series of international factors posited to expand contentious opportunities—especially foreign support and international contagion and diffusion.

[4]This literature has long noted the importance of cultural markers (language, race, religion) and boundary-formation in ethnopolitical struggles (Coser, 1956; Barth, 1969; Anderson, 1991; Brass, 1991; Calhoun, 1993) as well as the distinctive, powerful psychological pull of appeals to the national group identity (Horowitz, 1985; Connor, 1993).

been essentially two distinct general approaches to testing the model (Moore and Gurr, 1998, who compare the methods): a unidirectional approach using traditional OLS or MLE regression techniques (Gurr 1993a, 1993b, 2000; Moore and Gurr, 1998) or a multi-equation, multi-directional "theoretical regression model" using a 3SLS estimator (Lindström and Moore, 1995; Gurr and Moore, 1997; Moore and Gurr, 1998).

Though it is important the model be tested in a variety of formats (Moore and Gurr, 1998), I concur with Lindström and Moore (1995) that the multidirectional 3SLS "theoretical regression model" allows for a more accurate representation of the causal relationships found in Gurr's model. Upon closer inspection of the argument (1993a, 1993b, 1996, 2000), we see that the relationships among rebellion and the four key explanatory factors are not all unidirectional. Opportunities, mobilization, and grievances do directly impact levels of ethnopolitical rebellion, but grievances also have a direct effect on mobilization, while identity only has an indirect impact on rebellion via mobilization (Gurr, 2000). The end result is an essentially interdependent causal model that is not well served by testing via traditional OLS and MLE statistical models.

Gurr and Moore (1997) and Moore and Gurr (1998) argue that, in order to fully understand the interactive system of relationships impacting rebellion, we also need to take into account the role of two additional factors. First, we must recognize the importance of *regime responses* to collective action—especially the mix of accommodation and repression—in ameliorating or exacerbating domestic and ethnopolitical conflict (Lichbach, 1987; Francisco, 1995; Beissinger, 1996; Schock, 1996; Gurr and Moore, 1997; Moore, 1998, 2000). Second, we must recognize the powerful feedback effect generated by *rebellion* itself, which has been marked as one of the leading causes of elevated levels of state repression (Francisco, 1995; Moore, 2000).

The linkages among the four core factors with the effects of rebellion and repression added are depicted graphically in Figure 1.This precise system of relationships represents Gurr's interactive model of ethnopolitical rebellion and forms the basis for the present test as well as those by Gurr and Moore (1997) and Moore and Gurr (1998).[5] All three of these tests operationalize the model as an interdependent system comprising four endogenous variables (highlighted in *Figure 1* in boldface font). *Rebellion,* first of all, is the direct

[5]Gurr's model has evolved slightly from its earlier incarnations (Gurr, 1993a, 1993b). The primary change has been the explicit incorporation of opportunities into the explanation (Gurr, 1996, 2000). The Lindström and Moore (1995) test was based on the earlier version of the model. Consequently, the most important comparisons regarding model specification are to the Gurr and Moore (1997) and Moore and Gurr (1998) studies. I will, however, make comparisons to the Lindström and Moore article where theoretically appropriate.



Figure 1. Theoretical Regression Model: Linkages Among the Core Concepts

product of grievances, mobilization, and opportunities. *Mobilization*, in turn, is directly influenced by the strength of the group's identity, by its grievances, and by state repression. *Grievances* are a function of repression and collective disadvantages (exogenous, not shown); and *state repression* is a product of rebellion and various exogenous regime characteristics (Moore and Gurr, 1998). Each of these endogenous variables becomes the dependent variable in the system of simultaneous equations estimated via 3SLS. Now that we understand the causal linkages among the primary factors, we must fully specify their determinants.

OPERATIONALIZATION, DESIGN, AND METHODS

Case Selection and Research Design

To operationalize the variables in the model I utilize data gathered from a variety of sources on the seventeen regions in Spain over a twenty-year period (1977–1996). The unit of analysis is the region/year. Data for all variables (except for the three regime-level variables *democracy*, *democratization*, and *democratic durability*, which vary temporally) are coded individually for each region each year, for a total of 323 observations.[6]

[6]The data set includes 340 total observations. However, since one of the variables is lagged, 323 observations are used to estimate the coefficients.

Both the location and the time frame chosen for the study are important. The analysis begins as the democratic Transition (1975–1982) was in its initial stages and ends after the democratization process had been firmly entrenched, thereby affording ample variation in the regime-level opportunity factors central to the theoretical model. At the same time, the Spanish state contains a number of important ethnopolitical movements that vary in terms of strength, the use of violence, and outcomes. In order to get a more realistic view of how nationalism does—or does not—develop, we must account for this variation without sampling on the dependent variable.[7] The present design avoids this problem by measuring rebellion in all seventeen historic regions of the country.

MODEL SPECIFICATION

As Gurr argues (2000), whenever we attempt to export a model, certain factors become more, or less, important, depending on the environment in which it is applied. The precise causes of ethno-regional grievances may be different in Spain, for example, than they are in France. For this reason, Gurr outlines a model that is sufficiently generic that it can be translated to almost any case throughout the international system. In practical terms, this means that a version of the model operationalized for a large-N, static cross-national test (Gurr and Moore, 1997; Moore and Gurr, 1998) has been slightly retooled for the cross-temporal investigation of rebellion in seventeen regions of Spain. *Figure 2* below depicts this fully specified version of the model. Conceptually, all three tests use the identical interactive model depicted in *Figure 1*.There are two main operational differences between the first two MAR studies and the present test. First, two of the variables previously used—state power and past repression success—are not included here because they would not yield sufficient variation. Second, the determinants of group grievances, as discussed below, have been slightly modified to fit the context of Spain. The specific differences between the statistical models are noted below.

[7]This has been a concern with the Minorities at Risk (MAR) data set, for example. Although MAR represents an excellent resource for testing a wide array of ethnic and national phenomena cross-nationally, there has been some speculation that the data set does not adequately incorporate weak or "potential" cases of nationalism (Fearon and Laitin, 1997). For instance, data are included only on the two strongest cases within Spain—the Basques and the Catalans. In response, I have included all of the historic regions of Spain—many of which contain "dead," "latent," "inactive" or "nascent" ethno-regional identities. For none do I attempt to judge the "genuineness" of the regional identity, nor do I deny the considerable strength and legitimacy of the "Spanish" national identity throughout Spain.



Figure 2. Fully Specified Model of Ethnopolitical Rebellion in Spain

$$\text{Rebellion} = \alpha + \beta_1\text{Grievances} + \beta_2\text{Mobilization} + \beta_3\text{Contagion} + \beta_4\text{Rebellion}_{t-1} + \varepsilon \quad \text{Equation 1:}$$

Details on the operationalization of all explanatory variables are found in *Appendix*1. Special attention is warranted on the primary explananda in the analysis, ethnopolitical rebellion. *Rebellion* is an annual event count of the number of rebellious ethnopolitical actions that take place in each of the seventeen regions.[8] The primary source for the assignment of these rebellion scores is an event data set developed from a nonsampled investigation of the annual indices to the Spanish daily *El País* from 1977–1996.[9] These indices contain categorized summary reports of all articles appearing in the print version, and each summary report includes information on the time, place, actions, actors, and incidents surrounding each episode.[10] Using the same classificatory scheme as the MAR project,[11] I recorded information on 2,196 events of ethnopolitical rebellion spread across seven different regions throughout Spain from 1977–1996. To control for potential temporal dependence, I have also specified a lagged version of rebellion.

The primary proximate causes of rebellion are hypothesized to be the grievances suffered by and the level of mobilization achieved in an ethnonational community. Both have been found to have a powerful positive impact on the extent of ethnopolitical rebellion (Moore and Jaggers, 1990; Gurr, 1993a, 1993b, 1996; Lindström and Moore, 1995; Scarritt and McMillan, 1995; Gurr and Moore, 1997; Dudley and Miller, 1998).

[8]Previous tests of the model used MAR's ordinal seven-category *rebellion* variable. I also ran the system using an analogous construct, yet there were no changes in sign or significance in any of the model variables.

[9]This data-gathering technique has thus far been used primarily with the *New York Times* (e.g., World Handbook data). The best sources for analyzing the full range of ethno-nationalist contentious events in Spain, however, are Spanish newspapers. The *NYT* would be a more accessible source, but it is doubtful that this would contain much information on anything but the largest of violent actions. The best Spanish source, furthermore, would be country-wide in scope and located in the geographic center of the country (i.e., not based in one of the regions with a salient ethnopolitical movement). Only two newspapers—the center-right ABC and the center-left *El País*—satisfy these criteria. *ABC,* unfortunately, was too closely associated with the Franco regime before and during the Transition. As of 2000, the index to *El País* was available from mid-1976 (when the newspaper was founded) until the end of 1996.

[10]An alternative technique is to use a sample of full-length articles. Kriesi et al. (1995), who used this method, provide an in-depth discussion of the relative trade-offs. An increasingly popular technique, not normally feasible for historical or foreign-language presses, is the automated coding of electronic sources (Schrodt and Gerner, 1997).

[11]In MAR, violent events are generally coded as *rebellion*, non-violent events as *protest*. The one exception concerns rioting, which is coded under *protest* due to the fact that the violence is not premeditated.

In addition, the more extensive the opportunities to engage in contentious activity, the more likely that community is to develop rebellion. The literature points to a variety of ways of operationalizing those domestic and external factors that expand the opportunities of the group to engage in antistate ethnopolitical rebellion.[12] In the various operational versions of Gurr's model, opportunities have been measured via four discrete variables: state power, the contagion or diffusion of communal conflict,[13] institutional democracy, and democratization.

First, Gurr (1993b), Lindström and Moore (1995), and Gurr and Moore (1997) found that rebellion diminishes the more thoroughly a state penetrates society. The state power variable used to test this is primarily meant to delineate "hollow" developing states from the far-reaching states of the developed world (Gurr, 2000). As noted above, since the Spanish state has a high level of capacity throughout the time frame of the study, it has not been included in the analysis.

Second, Gurr (1993b), Lindström and Moore (1995), and Gurr and Moore (1997) all found evidence that the occurrence of ethnopolitical rebellions in outlying regions provides a model for action for other contentious groups (see also Hill and Rothchild, 1986). Saideman (1998) and Gurr (2000) argue that such contagion effects are most powerful among comparable groups in the same country. The extent of external rebellion in the other regions of Spain should, accordingly, be positively associated with ethnopolitical rebellion.

Finally, Gurr's model incorporates the impacts of several static and dynamic measures of the openness of the political system: *democracy,* a static indicator of a country's level of institutionalized democracy; *democratic durability,* a dynamic measure of the number of years a country goes without major or abrupt change in its political institutions after a successful transition to democracy; and *democratization,* the direction and extent of change in a country's regime type (i.e., *democracy*) score from the previous year. Gurr argues that these three factors should have primarily an indirect effect on rebellion—the first two via repression, the last via mobilization.[14] This idea was bolstered by evidence that, when institutional democracy and democratic regime change variables were also included in

[12]In an early overview, Tarrow (1988) found that the most common POS variables were regime type, state capacity and stability, elite divisiveness, repression, and the presence of enemies and allies in the social movement sector.

[13]Contagion occurs when one group's actions indirectly impact the strategic or tactical development of non-kinship groups elsewhere, while diffusion involves the direct spillover of rebellion from one region to the next.

[14]Consequently, the only regime-level indicator Gurr includes in the rebellion equation (Gurr and Moore, 1997; Moore and Gurr, 1998) is "democratic power" (the multiplicative effects of institutional democracy and state power).

the rebellion equation in other runs of the data (Gurr and Moore, 1997), none attained significance. A replication of that effort here produced the same results: democracy, democratization, and democratic durability were all insignificant determinants of rebellion when added to the rebellion equation.[15] Since that test resulted in no changes in sign or significance in any of the other variables in the model, those results will not be reported.

$$\text{Equation 2}: \text{Mobilization} = \alpha + \beta_1\text{Identity} + \beta_2\text{Repression} + \beta_3\text{Grievance} + \beta_4\text{Group Size} + \beta_5\text{Democratization} + \varepsilon$$

Gurr argues that mobilization, "the extent to which group members commit their energies and resources to collective action in pursuit of shared interests" (2000, p. 74), is dependent, "first of all, on the salience of group identity and shared incentives" (2000, p. 79). In particular, the cohesiveness of the group's identity acts as a crucial resource facilitating the capacity of leaders to mobilize the group, while government repression and collective grievances supply the essential incentive, or reason, for group mobilization. Two "objective conditions," group size and spatial concentration, then further enhance a group's mobilization potential: "Groups that are large in absolute numbers…and in proportion to the country's population…hypothetically are more likely than small groups to mobilize for substantial political action. And communal groups that are concentrated in one geographical region are more likely to engage in rebellion than dispersed and urban groups…." (Gurr, 1993b, p. 175).[16] Lindström and Moore (1995) and Gurr and Moore (1997) both found evidence for the hypothesized impacts of identity and grievances on

[15]As noted above on p. 5, the three regime-level variables (democracy, democratization, and democratic durability) do not vary across regions in any given year. Instead, they vary *over time*. It is this cross-temporal nature of the design that facilitates the test of Gurr's hypotheses concerning these variables. See below for specific arguments about how each of the individual factors indirectly impacts levels of rebellion.

[16]Others have also recently begun to theorize on the indirect role that relative group size plays on rebellion via its direct effect on *governmental* policies and practices. Benson and Kugler (1998) make the general claim that, the larger the relative size of an opposition group, the more threatening it is to the state. Fearon and Laitin (1999, p. 31) make the specific argument that, "Other things [being] equal, larger groups have more individuals willing to rebel for any given level of counterinsurgent spending, and this implies that they produce more damage for the state. In turn, this leads the state to fight harder to limit the damage…." Lee, Lindström, Moore and Turan (2002) extend these arguments in claiming that the state is more likely to resort to repression to counter the perceived challenge of relatively large minority ethnic groups—especially following major political change.

mobilization, while the former also found support for the impact of a composite measure of group size and concentration. With the exception of spatial concentration (which is not tested because all of the groups are highly concentrated), I expect similar relationships here.

Gurr also posits (Moore and Gurr, 1998; Gurr, 2000) that the instability and insecurity engendered by democratic regime change can create a substantial transient increase in the opportunities for group mobilization. Though none of the three prior tests of the interactive model have been able to test this hypothesis, there is now a sizable literature that supports it.[17]

$$\text{Equation 3}: \text{Grievances} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Lost Autonomy} + \beta_2 \text{Repression} - \beta_3 \text{Regional Political Control} - \beta_4 \text{Education} - \beta_5 \text{Regional GDP} + \beta_6 \text{Unemployment} + \varepsilon$$

A decade ago Gurr noted (1993b, p. 192) that, "In macro-empirical research on relative deprivation it is generally assumed that collective action is a function of objective conditions which are defined *a priori* as sources of deprivation and discontent. In research on resource mobilization the assumption is that collective action is a function of a group's structurally determined interests. In neither research tradition are grievances, interests, or demands measured directly." In response to this predominant usage of objective, yet *indirect* indicators of grievances, Gurr (1993b) set out to directly measure "active" grievances, that is, those that are actually felt or expressed by political actors. In his initial tests Gurr (1993b) used two such direct indicators—one a measure of autonomy-related grievances and another a combined indicator of economic, social, and political grievances.[18] Here I employ a measure similar in substance to the former; namely, *Grievances* was created by using the percentage (0–100) of residents in each community that responded in favor of regional independence in periodically recurring surveys. This variable should hence be interpreted as a direct measure of autonomy-related grievances and interests rather than as a general indicator of all potential economic, social, or political grievances. This is particularly well suited for the study of *nationalist* political actors: the design effectively facilitates a test of the extent to which the

[17] Fearon and Laitin (2000) provide a solid overview of "ethnic entrepreneurship" in democratizing societies. Roeder (1991), Posen (1993), and Olzak and Tsutsui (1998) provide complementary analyses of the connections between political instability and ethnic "outbidding" and "security dilemmas."

[18] Lindström and Moore (1995) and Gurr and Moore (1997) also used the combined indicator; both found it to be positively related to mobilization yet insignificant in the rebellion equation.

economic, social, and political grievances enumerated below impact the development of "active" political autonomy grievances.

There are three basic categories of such grievances in the model that lend a group the incentive to mobilize for political action: "(1) the extent of their material, political, and cultural disadvantages; (2) the historical loss of political autonomy; and (3) the extent to which force has been used to establish and maintain their subordinate status" (Gurr, 2000, p. 73).[19] While repression (Schock, 1996; Beissinger, 1996) and lost political autonomy are relatively straightforward concepts whose escalatory effects have been posited by Lindström and Moore (1995), Gurr and Moore (1997) and Moore and Gurr (1998), among others, the concept of collective disadvantages, which refers to "socially derived inequalities in material well-being, political access, or cultural status by comparison with other social groups" (Gurr, 2000, p. 71), has been specified a number of different ways. Gurr and Moore (1997) included measures of political discrimination, economic discrimination and demographic distress, Moore and Gurr (1998) used economic, political and cultural discrimination, and Lindström and Moore (1995) tested a composite measure derived from seven discrete indicators of collective disadvantage.

None of the above is satisfactory for measuring the collective disadvantages of ethnopolitical groups in Spain. Not only are the objective conditions of deprivation denoted by "demographic distress" (poor health, high birth rates, resettlements, etc.) simply not found in democratic Spain, but there is little or no discrimination of any of the country's ethnoregional groups in either economic, cultural or political terms. For this reason, the model is better served by returning to the underlying conceptual foundations of collective disadvantages.

Though the "cultural status" aspect of collective disadvantages is not so applicable, there are pertinent grievances regarding the relative "material well-being" and "political access" of the groups studied. Gurr argues, in particular, that material grievances can derive from such factors as unequal economic growth,[20] expanding educational opportunities, and

[19] Gurr and Moore (1997) use a measure of past repression. Their precise argument, though, is that "ethnopolitical groups victimized *in the recent past* harbor grievances toward the agents of repression" [emphasis added] (p. 1085). Given the annual coding of the variables in the data set, I use current repression scores to capture this idea. Out of interest, I ran a separate test using the lag of repression instead. That test likewise showed a positive relationship between repression and grievances, and resulted in changes in four other variables in the model: *lost autonomy* gained significance, while *regime change*, GDP, and *democratic durability* lost significance. Because of the reasons cited, however, I maintain that those findings are not as valid. They will hence not be discussed further.

[20] An indicator of unequal economic growth differs from the "economic discrimination" indicators used in the previous 3SLS studies insofar as the former merely taps the existence of intergroup economic differentials, while the latter measures the existence of discriminatory state economic policies. In the MAR data set, the two corresponding variables are *ecdiff* and *ecdis*.

high inflation rates (1993a). The astonishingly high unemployment rates that plagued many regions of Spain in the 1980s and 1990s provide another potent material incentive for collective action. I therefore posit a strong role for *unemployment, GDP,* and *education* in determining regional grievances.

There is some evidence, however, that lower levels of *GDP* and *education* will not produce more intense grievances. First, there is evidence that economic development per se does not necessarily lead to a redress of economic-based grievances (see, among others, Bookman, 1993). In fact, in certain cases (e.g., Catalonia) regional leaders may feel that, despite their relative wealth, their region would be even wealthier were they to have formed a separate country. The contradictory social forces unleashed by economic development further increase the difficulty in predicting the overall impact of increased GDP on contention. In addition to quelling economic-based grievances (Weede, 1981; Muller and Weede, 1990; Auvinen, 1997), economic development leads to processes of social change that generate new and often more contentious forms of intergroup and class conflict. At the same time, economic wealth and education are associated with both social capital (Putnam, 1993) and social mobilization (Deutsch, 1954), which have been posited to increase community mobilizational capacity.

In short, there are good reasons for characterizing lagging economic and educational performance as factors that sharpen the grievances of ethnic and national communities, and equally cogent arguments for citing heightened regional GDP and education as factors that enhance the mobilization potential of these communities. Gurr's implicit argument, though, is that the grievance side of the equation is stronger. The existence of intergroup differentials in such variables should produce a relative sense of deprivation that leads to heightened communal grievances. Though there is some ambiguity over whether this relationship will obtain,[21] including the variables will help us advance the theoretical model's utility. It would be especially helpful to know which of the posited deprivation factors enhance autonomy-related grievances, and which do not. Given that GDP and education are central factors in the model that are, moreover, especially applicable to the case of Spain, incorporating them into the analysis should generate useful results.

Lastly, Gurr argues that state expansion and centralization will give rise to grievances when they result in a diminishing of the group's autonomy and political access. Regional autonomy was low for all cases in Spain until the 1980s, and varied thereafter. Hence, I expect the extent

[21] Though differentiating the various effects of economic growth would provide fertile ground for further investigation, it is beyond the scope of the present analysis.

of *regional political control* to be negatively associated with group grievances.

$$\text{Equation 4}: \text{Repression} = \alpha + \beta_1\text{Rebellion} - \beta_2\text{Democracy} - \beta_3\text{Democratic Durability} + \varepsilon$$

Gurr and Moore (1997) and Moore and Gurr (1998) model repression as a function of three variables: (1) rebellion, (2) past repression success, and (3) democracy.[22] The first hypothesis is relatively straightforward: "the state's use of repression is driven by internal challenges" (Gurr and Moore, 1997, p. 1085). I similarly posit that repression will wax and wane according to the rhythms of ethnopolitical rebellion. The state will be more likely to apply coercive means of social control in those regions that resort to rebellious tactics.

The second hypothesis is that elites are more likely to utilize repressive measures when they have found tactical success with repression in the past. Gurr and Moore (1997) found that, in fact, past repression success was strongly associated with increased rebellion. However, because of this test's cross-temporal design, because none of the rebellions escalate to an all-out guerrilla or civil war, and because the Spanish case in some years involves several active ethnopolitical rebellions, the variable they used would not translate well here.[23]

Third, Gurr argues that the values and institutions of democracy tend to pacify the rebellious tendencies of potentially violent ethnic communities insofar as democratic states are less likely to rely on coercive means of social control. The relationship between regime type and repression actually involves two distinct hypotheses (Gurr, 2000): (1) higher levels of institutional *democracy* (a static measure of regime type) will diminish elite preferences for coercion (Gurr and Moore, 1997); and (2) the greater

[22] There is evidence that past repression is another important determinant of current levels of repression (Davenport, 1996). However, an additional test of the model with a lagged value of repression added to the equation found no such association (there were no changes in sign or significance in any of the other model variables). In the end, because the focus here is on testing Gurr's model of rebellion, I have decided not to report further these results.

[23] The authors (Gurr and Moore, 1997) relied on a five-point scale with the categories "regime win," "regime near-win," "outcome indeterminate," "regime crisis," and "regime transformation." This is problematic in several respects for the current study. First, the scale is most appropriate for understanding the highest levels of rebellion, where it is easiest to determine the impact (e.g., in the guise of cease-fires) of regime responses. In Spain, however, in none of the cases does rebellion escalate beyond assassinations, kidnappings and terrorist bombings. Second, since there were often several regions rebelling in any given year, it would be difficult to determine which regional rebellion was behind any regime-level changes that may have taken place.

the *democratic durability* (the number of uninterrupted democratic years since the transition to democracy), the less likely elites are to resort to repression due to historical success at accommodation (Gurr, 1988). As with *democratization* in the mobilization equation, none of the three previous tests of Gurr's interactive model was able to test the democratic durability hypothesis—which involves a temporal process—because their research designs were cross-sectional.[24] The cross-temporal design used here thus allows for the first full test of Gurr's hypotheses about the impact of regime type on ethnopolitical conflict.

RESULTS

Table 1 reports the results of the 3SLS estimation of the rebellion system. Only one of the eighteen right-hand-side variables in the four equations failed to attain statistical significance. Before summarizing the system as a whole and discussing the theoretical implications of the findings, I will first examine the results in the four individual equations.

Rebellion Equation

The predictions for this equation were strongly confirmed: ethnopolitical rebellion is dependent on the extent of a community's autonomy-related grievances, the strength of its mobilization, and the degree to which rebellion is diffused throughout the rest of the country. This replicates the positive coefficients for mobilization and contagion found in previous cross-national 3SLS tests (Lindström and Moore, 1995; Gurr and Moore, 1997) and for the first time presents evidence of the direct impact of grievances on rebellion.[25]

Mobilization Equation

All of the variables in the mobilization equation were also significant, though there are important differences between the present results and those of previous studies. Here, mobilization is more extensive the stronger

[24] "Our research design prohibits us from fully probing the democracy --> repression linkage because the argument describes a temporal process whereas our research design is cross-sectional" (Gurr and Moore, 1997, p. 1085).

[25] Moore and Gurr (1998) discuss the specification of the theoretical model but not the results of the individual variables. Instead, they test the ability of the model as a whole to assess the risks of initiation and escalation of rebellious ethnopolitical activity for at-risk groups. Consequently, comparisons of results here are centered on the 1997 Gurr and Moore article.

Table 1. 3SLS Estimation of Regional Ethnopolitical Rebellion in Spain, 1977-1996 (n = 323)

Independent Variables	Coefficient	Standard Error
Equation 1: Rebellion		
Grievances	0.39***	0.12
Mobilization	2.45*	1.48
Contagion	0.04***	0.01
$Rebellion_{t-1}$	0.80***	0.04
Constant	–6.59***	1.84
Equation 2: Mobilization		
Identity	0.03***	0.01
Repression	10.84***	1.12
Grievances	–0.08***	0.02
Group Size	–0.03***	0.01
Democratization	0.10*	0.06
Constant	0.30***	0.12
Equation 3: Grievances		
Lost Autonomy	0.61	0.60
Repression	55.12***	6.81
Regional Control	2.09***	0.70
Education	0.17**	0.08
Regional GDP per capita	0.03**	0.02
Unemployment	0.10**	0.05
Constant	–17.60**	7.34
Equation 4: Repression		
Rebellion	0.003***	0.0005
Democracy	–0.05***	0.02
Democratic Durability	0.005***	0.002
Constant	0.35***	0.11

Rank and order conditions of all four equations in the system are identified.
*$p \leq 0.1$ (two-tailed)
**$p \leq 0.05$ (two-tailed)
***$p \leq 0.01$ (two-tailed)

the identity, the harsher the repression, the smaller the population, the less extensive the grievances, and the greater the democratic regime change.

Like Gurr and Moore (1997), *identity* is positively related to mobilization for rebellion. New is the evidence for Gurr's hypothesis that repression also has a direct positive impact on levels of mobilization. In previous 3SLS analyses repression had failed to attain significance. The negative coefficient for *grievances,* however, was unexpected. Previous studies had found a positive association for grievances in the mobilization equation but no association in the rebellion equation. Here, autonomy-related grievances are positively associated with rebellion but negatively

associated with mobilization. This finding vis-à-vis mobilization is curious, and there is no readily available theoretical explanation.[26]

Likewise, whereas Lindström and Moore (1995) found a positive association between group size and mobilization (albeit a composite measure that combined group size and concentration), the present test yields a negative relationship. Despite the lack of a compelling theoretical explanation for this finding,[27] it is evident that in Spain some of the smallest groups—Navarre, the Basque Country, and both the Balearic and Canary Islands—had the highest levels of mobilization. This continues the pattern of mixed results for group size found in previous studies. In Gurr's (1993b) initial bivariate examination of the correlates of mobilization, neither absolute nor relative group population size variables obtained a significant correlation with mobilization for rebellion, though both were positively correlated with mobilization for protest (1993b). In a large-scale re-analysis of the MAR data, Fearon and Laitin (2003, p. 11) did find "a weak tendency for larger groups to be more disposed to violence;" however, in two tests of the MAR data on the determinants of demands for independence in the 1980s and 1990s, Saideman and Ayres encountered ambiguous results: they first found (1999) that relative—but not absolute—group size was positively associated with secessionist and irredentist group demands, while in a later version of the test (2000) only absolute group size obtained significance in certain cases. Because of the diverse findings, I concur with Saideman and Ayres (1999) that, "Clearly, we require more theoretical and empirical work to determine precisely how relative size influences the desires of groups."

Lastly, the findings show a positive relationship between the extent of democratic regime change and mobilization for rebellion. This confirms Gurr's hypothesis about the potentially destabilizing effect of transitions to democracy. If the premise is correct, the instability and intergroup insecurity surrounding Spain's transition increased the incentive for group

[26] One plausible explanation for the disparity between past and present results lies in the different measures of mobilization employed. The MAR team, in fact, has never been fully satisfied with the various measures of mobilization, and for this reason they have been dropped from current MAR analyses (Gurr, 2003, personal communication). An important task for further research will therefore be to strive to perfect the reliability and validity of indicators of organizational mobilization.

[27] An anonymous reviewer pointed out that though the "finding that smaller groups have higher levels of Mobilization is consistent with what many would expect from Olson's (1965) argument about group size and collective action…, all of these groups are too large for face-to-face relationships, and…small groups [e.g., the members of a neighborhood organization] must rely on face-to-face relationships for Olson's size argument to have much effect." Since the smallest community, La Rioja, with a population of 244,737 in 1977, is a "large" group in Olson's schemata, I agree that we will have to search elsewhere for a theoretical explanation for the current findings. In effect, all of the groups are likely too large for either a "threshold" argument (Grannovetter, 1978) or "small group" argument (Olson, 1965) to be relevant.

mobilization at the same time as it generated transient opportunities for collective action.

Grievance Equation

Gurr argues that grievances are the direct product of repression, lost historical autonomy, and collective disadvantages.The findings replicate previous studies by showing a powerful role for *repression,* but not *lost autonomy,* in the generation of group grievances. For collective disadvantages the findings are not as readily comparable. Lindström and Moore (1995) found a positive association, but theirs was a composite measure. Gurr and Moore (1997) found that demographic distress (which, for earlier stated reasons, is not tested here) and economic discrimination obtained positive relationships with grievances. In the present test lower levels of education and of relative levels of regional GDP per capita are associated with *diminished* autonomy-related grievances. This contradicts the deprivation hypothesis with regards to these two variables; it effectively suggests that any reduced sense of grievance associated with greater relative economic wealth and improved education is not strong enough to overpower the increased capacity for mobilization engendered by the concurrent increases in social capital and social mobilization.[28]

The two final components of collective disadvantages are *unemployment* and *regional political control.* As expected, higher levels of unemployment are associated with higher levels of political autonomy grievances. When, for example, unemployment rates skyrocketed in Valencia from 3.7 percent in 1977 to 20.8 percent in 1985, it is not surprising that nationalist resentment increased. Unexpected, however, was the finding that levels of *regional political control* were also positively associated with grievances. The bad news for federalists is that the devolution of power to regional communities achieved no ameliorative impact on levels of ethnopolitical aggrievement. The unfortunate implication is that there may be some sort of disconnect between conventional access to the political system and violent conflict processes. As suggested by some scholars (e.g., Nordlinger, 1972; Roeder, 1991; Snyder, 1999), federalism and other forms of devolution may actually lead to increased contention among nationalist groups.

REPRESSION EQUATION

Summarizing the results thus far, we have seen that communities that are more intensely repressed and have more powerful economies,

[28] As mentioned earlier, such is merely implied by the findings. Differentiating the various causal processes unleashed by economic development is beyond the scope of the present study.

greater regional political control, higher levels of education, and higher unemployment levels contain greater levels of autonomy-related *grievances*; that smaller, more cohesive groups suffering from more intense repression during periods of democratization are more likely to *mobilize* for rebellion; and that more mobilized and aggrieved communities in a "contagious" environment are more prone to *rebel*. Here we complete the causal chain by examining the determinants of state *repression* of ethnopolitical protest groups.

This equation thus highlights the complicated relationships among democracy, repression, and rebellion posited by Gurr. His argument, once again, is that democracy and democratic durability have a primarily indirect impact on rebellion through repression. In particular, Gurr argues that elite preferences for coercion will be reduced in states with higher levels of institutional democracy, while the more durable the democratic regime becomes, the less likely elites are to resort to repression due to historical success at accommodation. In short, both *democracy,* a static indicator of the level of institutional democracy, and *democratic durability,* a measure of the number of uninterrupted democratic years since the transition to democracy, should be negatively associated with repression.

The results first show that, as expected, higher levels of ethnopolitical rebellion are associated with elevated levels of state repression. The evidence thus suggests a vicious cycle of tit-for-tat escalation: rebellion leads to repression, which intensifies grievances and mobilization, which in turn lead to heightened rebellion, which leads to more repression, ad infinitum.[29]

This test was also able to operationalize for the first time Gurr's ideas about the cross-temporal process of *democratic durability*. The result was surprising: the durability of the democratic regime was positively associated with the rate of repression. Though not predicted, evidence from a large-scale cross-national test by Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch

[29]**The interpretation of the coefficients (i.e., the direct effects) in the individual equations is the same as with OLS, where a one-unit increase in X corresponds to a coefficient change in Y. With 3SLS analyses we can also derive the indirect effects and the net total effects (i.e., direct plus indirect impacts) of the endogenous variables. For example, in Table I, the equation for deriving the net total effects of grievances on rebellion is 0.194 = (0.39) + (2.45) × (- 0.08), with the first term the direct effect and the second the indirect effect through mobilization. In fact, we can see that, despite the negative direct impact of grievances on mobilization, the net total effect of grievances on rebellion is positive (0.194). The net total effect of repression on rebellion (indirect via mobilization and grievances), meanwhile, is quite powerful at 48.055. Vis-à-vis mobilization, in turn, repression has both a direct impact and an indirect impact through grievances. The net total effect of repression on mobilization is 6.430. We can also calculate the indirect effects of rebellion on both mobilization (0.033) and grievances (0.165). Lastly, we see that mobilization (0.007) and grievances (0.001) have positive, if limited, indirect effects on repression via rebellion.**

(2001) does offer a potentially useful explanation: "The most reliable path to stable democratic peace in the long run is to democratize as much as possible, …but if semidemocracies experience a succession of transitions in and around the middle zone, it will take a long time before there is a net decrease in violence…. In the short run, a democratizing country will have to live through an unsettling period of change" (p. 44). The implication, in short, is that Spain is still dealing with the effects of its historic transition to democracy.

The findings do, however, lend further support to the idea that states with higher levels of institutional *democracy* are less likely to resort to repression (Gurr, 1988; Gupta et al., 1993; Poe and Tate, 1994; Davenport, 1995). These findings are important; overall, they corroborate Gurr's hypothesis that democracy has primarily an indirect, yet powerful, effect on rebellion (recall that an additional test of the model showed that when these two regime-type variables, along with *democratization,* were also included in the rebellion equation, none was significant). Considering the strong impact that repression has on rebellion, moreover, it is evident that democratic states are less likely to generate conditions that lead to a cycle of violence.

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper set out to test the ability of Gurr's interactive model to account for levels of regional ethnopolitical rebellion in post-Franco Spain. Beyond the introduction of more sophisticated measures for the majority of the central concepts, this study adds to previous work in being the first application of the interactive model not based on the Minorities at Risk data set. Moreover, because of the cross-temporal nature of the design, it represents the first test of the complete array of democracy-rebellion interactions posited by Gurr.

What does this test suggest about the efficacy of the theoretical model? The significance of the overwhelming majority of the variables in the system illustrates that, in post-Franco Spain, grievances, mobilization, repression and rebellion are, as predicted, four fundamental components of an interdependent causal system. The model has, moreover, proven to translate well to the case of democratic Spain. In fact, the results are even more favorable to Gurr's interactive model than any of the three prior tests. Unlike the present study, previous tests, for example, failed to find support for the influence of grievances on rebellion, of repression and democratic regime change on mobilization, and of democracy on repression—all key components in the model.

The results thus lend strong support to Gurr's integrated approach to modeling ethnopolitical contention. The model was born out of an effort

to amalgamate the three competing approaches to understanding domestic conflict; this study successfully shows that the grievances of the deprivation school, the mobilization of the resource mobilization approach, and the opportunities of structural political opportunity theory all play a critical part in the generation of ethnopolitical rebellion. Furthermore, in a manner that would be impossible to demonstrate using single-equation regressions, the 3SLS findings confirm that the relationships among grievances, mobilization, and opportunities are interactive in determining levels of rebellious ethnopolitical activity. This test thereby bolsters arguments (Tarrow, 1988; Moore and Jaggers, 1990; Gurr, 1993a, 1993b; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 1996; Lichbach, 1998) stating that, though there are certain benefits to treating the different approaches as distinct competitors, there are potentially greater benefits from attempts at theoretical synthesis.

The interactive nature of the model further builds on other approaches in its recognition that not all of the variables have a direct impact on conflict. The central argument is that, in a direct manner, rebellion is influenced by three factors: mobilization, grievances, and contagion.Mobilization, in turn, is affected by the strength of the regional identity, the intensity of the repression, the size of the population and the extent of democratization, while grievances are shown to be fueled by a combination of repression and collective disadvantages.

The analysis yielded interesting results regarding the determinants of these ethnopolitical grievances—three of the variables posited to tap deprivation worked in the opposite direction from that expected. Higher educational levels, better relative economic performance, and greater levels of regional political control were all associated with stronger feelings of autonomy-related grievances.These relationships should provide excellent fodder for further research. There is already evidence that political devolution, instead of appeasing regional ethnic groups, can have the opposite effect (Nordlinger, 1972; Roeder, 1991). Improved educational opportunities and economic performance, in turn, can lead to disruptive social change and heightened levels of social capital and social mobilization at the same time as they redress economic-based grievances.

Political opportunities also proved to have a powerful role in the production of ethnopolitical conflict. Since POS is a cluster concept comprising several distinct features of the external environment, there is no single equation that taps "opportunities" in the interactive model. In fact, only one of the variables, *contagion*, has a direct impact on levels of rebellion. The other factors—*democracy, repression, democratic durability,* and *democratization*—have primarily an indirect effect on rebellion via repression, mobilization, or grievances.

The findings also generally confirm Gurr's hypotheses of the complex indirect impact of the regime-type variables on rebellion. As expected, levels of democracy were negatively associated with the magnitude of state repression while the extent of democratic regime change was positively related to ethnopolitical mobilization. The only unanticipated outcome was that the durability of the democratic regime was found to have a positive relationship with repression.

The results do suggest several policy tools available to central governments dealing with rebellious ethnopolitical groups. Not surprisingly, the findings show that the communities most likely to contend are those that are mobilized. Governments can, nevertheless, have an impact on the extent of regional mobilization by reducing reliance on repressive measures. Governments might also be successful in ameliorating mobilization via comprehensive "nation-building" policies designed to counteract the more parochial or exclusive aspects of competing ethno-regional identities. Given the important impact of contagion on rebellion, states should also be wary of potential spillover effects from either kinship groups in neighboring countries or other contentious domestic communities. Finally, the data show that groups with the most intense independence-related grievances are, not surprisingly, also the most likely to rebel. Governments might therefore attempt to develop policies aimed at reducing the core grievances of contentious communities. Unfortunately, attempts at redressing relative political and economic deprivations via government decree can be a difficult and protracted undertaking. The results further suggest that massive regional economic development efforts may not do much to resolve the problem anyway. Relative levels of regional GDP per capita in this test were actually positively associated with feelings of deprivation.

In the end, given such an array of indirect and interdependent relationships, any government attempting to successfully negotiate the conflict resolution process would be wise to first remember the deceptively simple policy maxim, "everything is connected to everything else." The trick is not only to determine how things are related, but to effect change without suffering the consequences. A policy designed to implement change in one area may in fact have far-reaching or unintended consequences in another.

Nowhere is this clearer than with repression, the effects of which—uniformly negative—are felt throughout the conflict process. Repression is first and foremost directly associated with higher levels of both grievances and mobilization, which are themselves associated with higher levels of rebellion. And since rebellion is itself associated with contagion and repression, governments should recognize that it is plausible that coercive state measures could inadvertently activate a "vicious cycle,"

with repression intensifying mobilization and grievances, grievances and mobilization leading to rebellion, and rebellion spilling over to other regions and leading to greater repression, ad infinitum. States wishing a peaceful resolution to their troubles should therefore think twice before resorting to repression—or they may just find themselves victims of such a pernicious, yet "unintended" spiral of violence.

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APPENDIX I: MEASUREMENT OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

Regional GDP per capita

Regional GDP per capita measured as a proportion of the overall Spanish average of 100, adjusted annually. These scores (along with the updated Spanish average of 100) were available for each of the seventeen regions for 1973, 1985, 1989, 1991 and 1993. Missing years between 1977 and 1996 were given scores via interpolation and extrapolation.[Sources: Rodríguez, 1989; Heywood, 1995]

Identity

Measure of the cohesiveness of a group's identity. Average percentage (0—100) of those that responded favorably to the question, "Is your autonomous community a distinct 'nation'?" in surveys conducted in 1990, 1992, and 1996. The variable is a constant over time for each community. [Source: Moral, 1998]

Education

Percentage (0—100) of the regional population that is literate in 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992. Values for missing years determined via the interpolation and extrapolation functions in *Stata* 7.0. [Source: Fundació Bancaixa, 1995]

Unemployment

Annual regional unemployment rates. [Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística]

Group Size

Regional population as a percentage (0—100) of the country's total population in 1973, 1985 and 1991. Values for missing years extrapolated. [Source: Fundació Bancaixa, 1995]

Grievances

Subjective measure of extent of regional grievances. Group members who are in favor of independence presumably have strong autonomy-related grievances that could lead to mobilization into nationalist organizations. Grievance was therefore created by using the percentage (0—100) of

residents in each community that responded in favor of regional independence in surveys conducted in 1976, 1979, 1980 and 1990. Interpolation and extrapolation used to assign values for missing years. [Sources: Ferrando, 1980; Ferrando et al., 1994]

Lost Autonomy

Lost Autonomy is an index of potential grievances predicated on the loss of historical political privileges. Scores for the Basque Country and Catalonia were taken from the *autlost* variable in the MAR data set (Gurr, 1999). Scores for the other 15 regions were created using the same coding procedures. If a group has never lost autonomous political rights or undergone a transfer of control from one state to another, then its value is 0 ("no historical autonomy"). For all other groups, a score from 1 to 5 is given taking into consideration the extent of prior autonomy, the magnitude of the loss of autonomy, and the time elapsed since the loss. For all groups that experienced such a loss, the loss occurred in the past. All values are therefore constants over the time period under investigation.

Mobilization

Following MAR coding procedures, *mobilization* was operationalized by measuring annually the number of active militant organizations (milorg) in each region, up to a maximum of three, and the scope of popular support (milscop) for the largest of these organizations. As in MAR, the scope variable has a value of "1" if the movement is supported by less than 10% of the community, "2" if support is between 10% and 50%, and "3" if greater than 50%. In an enhancement of the original coding scheme, support was calculated via the percentage of the vote given to a militant organization's "political wing" in regional elections.[30] *Mobilization* is then the product of the organization and scope variables. Electoral and political party data derived from *El País: Anuario,* editions 1982–1996. Organizational data derived from numerous sources.

[30]The use of voting results to gauge the scope of popular support is a response to MAR's dissatisfaction with the reliability of their current measure (Gurr, 1999, p. 89). Such a strategy can be especially useful in democratic countries such as Spain. Numerous legal political parties on the far left have advocated revolutionary means of change; often, these parties have been associated with actively militant, illegal political organizations. For example, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) and Bloc Esquerra d'Acció Nacionalista (BEAN) in Valencia and Catalonia; Herri Batasuna (HB) and Euskadi Ezkerra

Regional Political Control

This variable combines a measure of regional autonomy with data on the party composition of the 17 regional governments.[31] *Regional control* is a dummy variable with values of "1" assigned to those communities for years in which its regional government is run either exclusively or in a coalition by a nationalist political party. The first regional parliaments commence in 1980 in Catalonia and the Basque Country, 1981 in Galicia, 1982 in Andalusia, and 1983 in the other 13 regions. In the Basque Country and Catalonia, the value is "1" for all years from 1980 to 1996. About half of the regions never receive such a score. [Source: *El País: Anuario,* editions 1982–1996]

Contagion

Total number of rebellious events recorded throughout Spain each year.

Repression

Using the MAR classificatory scheme, data on all non-violent nationalist "protest" events were recorded for all seventeen autonomous communities. *Repression* is an annual measure of the rate of state-caused injuries and deaths per protest event in each region. [Source: annual indices to *El País,* 1977–1996]

(EE) in Navarre and the Basque Country; and the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG) in Galicia all advocated violent means to their political ends. During that time, two of these were associated with active terrorist organizations—HB with the "military" wing of ETA (ETA-m, or Basque Homeland and Liberty—military), and EE with the slightly less radical "political-military" wing of ETA (ETA-pm). Shortly thereafter, in 1983, ETA-pm put down its arms and EE, following suit, ceased to support violent means. Accordingly, a vote for EE before 1983, and a vote for HB up to 1996, can safely be considered a vote of support for the militant organizations for which EE and HB were the political arms. At the same time, a vote for the ERC in Catalonia from 1977–1990 could be considered support for violence in Catalonia, even though no terrorist organization actually existed until Terra Lliure (Free Land) became active in 1980.

[31] In cross-national tests, it would make sense to operationalize the extent of regional incorporation into conventional policymaking via autonomy statutes and the like. Since all of the regions in Spain have attained a relatively high degree of political autonomy since 1983, however, further sophistication was necessary for the present test. Instead of merely measuring the existence of autonomy, I have also measured nationalist political parties' involvement in the regional governments.

Democracy

Democracy is calculated annually by averaging Spain's scores on Freedom House's political rights and civil liberties indices. On both indices, the range of possible values is from 1 (most open) to 7 (least open). To make scores more easily understandable, I have reversed the values (i.e., 7 is most open, 1 is least open). Values for Spain range from 4 in 1977 to 7 in 1996. [Source: Freedom House, 2000]

Democratization

Democratization is a measure of the extent of democratic regime change derived from the following formula:

$$\text{Democratization} = \text{Democracy}\,[t] - \text{Democracy}[t-1]$$

Positive values therefore indicate democratization and negative values moves towards autocracy. The possible range of values is from –7 to +7. Spain's actual range is from –0.5 in 1979, 1981 and 1994, to +2 in 1978.

Democratic Durability

Count of the number of uninterrupted democratic years since transition to democracy. Though the democratization process began in late 1975, the transition cannot be considered complete until 1982—after the creation of the constitution, after regional autonomy negotiations with secessionist-prone regions, and after the failed military coup d'état of 1981 effectively delegitimized remaining antidemocratic sentiments. Accordingly, the *durability* count begins at "1" in 1983 (for 1977–1982, the score is "0"). Since the state thereafter remained democratic, this count variable obtains a maximum value of "14" by 1996.